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COMMENTS AND NOTES
COMPULSORY COMMITMENT: THE RIGHTS
OF THE INCARCERATED MENTALLY ILL
The passage of the District of Columbia Hospitalization of
the Mentally Ill Act in 1965 and more recent legislative re-
evaluations of state mental health laws manifest a developing
concern over the plight of the mentally ill. However, though
much attention has been Jbcused on the commitment process,
it has been noted that legislative and public concern often has
stopped at the asylum door and has left the incarcerated
mentally ill at the mercy of inadequate facilities, deficient
treatment, and at times antiquated philosophies about mental
illness. In addition to reviewing the commitment process as it
now exists, this comment examines the "inner system" of
mental health, isolates some of its major inadequacies, and
evaluates current judicial and legislative attempts to inprove
the mental health picture inside the institution.
T he current American attitude toward the phenomenon of
mental illness is in many ways a reflection of the economic and
social conditions of the latter eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.'
Indeed, it is an unfortunate commentary on our lack of medical
and legal sophistication to note that current commitment
procedures and institutional conditions manifest in great measure
the "outworn popular misconceptions of the mentally sick or
insane or either raving maniacs, dangerous lunatics, or gibbering
idiots." 2 Though often medically and legally unreasonable,
contemporary approaches to mental health problems are
understandable when viewed in the light of historical antecedents:'
'See generally A. DEUTSCH. THE MENrALLY ILL IN A.IEPICA (2d ed. 1949) [hereinafter
cited as DEUTSCH]. 1. LIXDMIAN & D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW
(1961) [hereinafter cited as LItDNIA.\ & MCINTYREI.
2 Hearings on the Constitutional Rights oJ the Mentally" Ill BeJore the Subconint. oil
Constitutional Rights oJ the Senate Contn. on the Judiciary. 87th Cong., Ist Sess.. pt. I. at
43 (1961) (statement of Albert Deutsch, author and journalist) [hereinafter cited as 1961
Hearings].
: Green. Public Policies Underlying the Law oJ Mental Jnconipetencr. 38 MICH. L. REv.
1189 (1940), suggests that the harsh treatment of insane persons which occurs is due in part to
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It has been noted that the attitudes and modes of treatment
prevalent in early America were not peculiar to the colonies, but
rather grew out of conditions in the old world.4 Nevertheless, a
study of the care and treatment accorded the mentally ill during the
colonial period reveals the hopeless confusion then prevailing, for
certainly neither the nature nor proper treatment of mental disease
was understood. Although the first American asylum exclusively
for the mentally ill was opened in 1773 at Williamsburg, Virginia,
an actual therapeutic approach to mental illness was many years
away, and mere custodial confinement, much like that afforded to
indigents and petty criminals, marked the extent of society's
benevolence.5  It was not until the beginning of the nineteenth
century that mentally ill persons first came to be seen as sick rather
than cursed and as susceptible to aid through proper treatment. By
1830 eight states had established special institutions for the insane
However, despite such advances these few institutions could
accommodate but a small fraction of the total number of persons
suffering from mental diseases, and the cheap design of the physical
plants often disregarded essential details of construction and
equipmentY Perhaps the most serious problems concerned the
the anachronistic conception of the dualism of mind and body embraced by "psychiatrists" of
earlier periods and which unfortunately in many ways "'rules us from the grave." See general&v
DEUTSCH, supra note 1.
I It has been noted that '[d]uring the witchcraft delusions in Salem and elsewhere, the
mentally ill were hanged, imprisoned, tortured. and otherwise persecuted as agents of Satan.
Regarded as sub-human beings, they were chained in specially devised kennels and cages like
wild beasts, and thrown into prisons, bridewells and jails like criminals. They were
incarcerated in workhouse dungeons, or made to slave as able-bodied paupers, unclassified
from the rest. They were left to wander about stark naked, driven from place to place like
mad dogs, subjected to whippings as vagrants and rogues. Even the well-to-do were not
spared confinement in strong rooms and celler dungeons, while legislation usually concerned
itself more with their property than their persons." DErurscH. supra note I, at 53.
"Treatment" offered the mentally ill during colonial America was limited. "The violent
mentally ill were . . . accorded the treatment applicable to criminals generally, which
consisted of detention in jails. The non-violent and indigent insane, on the other hand, were
treated in the same fashion as were all other paupers, by being provided with food and
shelter.. . . [T]hese practices took notice of the distinctive character of the mentally ill as a
class, and it was only after mental institutions became prevalent that commitment to them
finally introduced a system designed especially for the mentally ill.- Kittrie, Compulsory
Mental Treaiment and the Requirenwnts oJ" "Due Process.- 21 Otno ST. L.J. 28, 31 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Kittrie].
Detrrscn. supra note 1, at 112.
A poor institution for the insane, it was believed, was better than none at all.
Consequently, hell-holes and "Bedlams" were tolerated as providing at least a modicum of
care for the mentally ill, while serving to protect society. Id. at 141-42.
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informal commitment procedures which then existed and the abuses
which developed from them.8 Under such statutes arose the most
famous of the nineteenth century "railroading" cases, that of Mrs.
E.P.W. Packard, who was committed in 1860 by her minister
husband to the Illinois State Hospital as "insane and distracted."'
Detained there for three years, she finally procured her own release
through habeas corpus proceedings and immediately began a
vigorous campaign for increased legal protection against wrongful
commitment.10
Unfortunately, legislative attempts to cure these deficiencies,
particularly the problem of improper commitments, manifested
themselves in statutory enactments which demonstrated some
degree of overreaction." Highly technical procedures, which for the
first time included judicial superivision and control, replaced the
previous informality. The Illinois "personal liberty" bill of 1867,
for example, provided that no person should be committed without
a jury trial and that all persons then in state hospitals be given a
jury trial to ascertain their mental condition.12 This emphasis on
I The informality of commitment procedures during this period led to numerous cases of
wrongful commitments. When the early asylums were first established commitment was
achieved with great ease, with little concern for the personal rights of the individual. For
some time, lack of legislative supervision and absence of public recognition permitted such
inequities to continue. See Curran. Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill. 31 N.C.L. REv. 274,
277 (1952).
9 Mrs. Packard was committed uilder the 1851 Illinois commitment statute, which
provided that "'married women and infants who, in the judgment of the medical
superintendants of the state asylum at Jacksonville are evidently insane or distracted, may be
entered or detained at the request of the husband or the guardian of the infant, without the
evidence required in other cases." 111. Laws 1851, § 10, at p. 96, 98. See Kittrie, supra note
5, at 33.
1O Mrs. Packard, in both books and lectures, sought the introduction of many of the
formal legal safeguards of crintinal due process into the field of mental health, including the
right to a hearing and a jury trial in determining the question of insanity. See Kittrie, supra
note 5, at 34.
11 The reasons for such overreaction are clear when the journalism and public opinion of
the 1860's are considered. For example, one Charles Reade, "a sensationalist writer of the
time . . . published a book called Hard Cash which made its appearance in America in
1860. It told the lurid tale of a rich young man who was committed to an insane asylum by
his business associate who had designs on his fortune. . . . The law under which the young
man was committed gave him little protection. The novel was highly successful and a public
clamor for safeguards in the law against wrongful commitment was raised throughout this
country and England." Curran, supra note 8, at 275.
12 The Illinois "personal liberty" bill of 1867, enacted primarily as a result of the efforts
of Mrs. Packard, replaced the very lax act of 1851. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
See DEUrSCH. supra note I, at 426.
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the judicial process and the borrowing of procedural safeguards
from the criminal law, which continued into the first half of this
century, in many respects served a valuable function. Much-needed
legislative attention was finally directed toward some of the more
glaring inequities of the mental health system, and public concern
was newly aroused.13 However, despite the changing judicial and
legislative climate, deficiencies persisted, and even in Illinois, where
Mrs. Packard's campaigns were most successful, the jury trial
procedure resulted in more commitments of sane persons than
under previous procedures. 4 Furthermore, these statutes, though
much concerned with the commitment process, failed to devote
sufficient attention to the rights of the individiial while in the
asylum with legislative concern often stopping at the hospital
door.15
Recent years have witnessed a growing disenchantment with the
judicially-enforced, criminal law oriented procedures for mental
commitment, and some states have abandoned the jury trial
altogether. In addition, statutes more attuned to the unique needs
" See Kadish, A Case Study in the Signijication oJ Procedural Due
Process-Institutionalizing the Mentally 1/1, 9 W. POLITICAL Q.. 93, 103-06, 112-15 (1956).
For an eloquent statement see In re Lugo's Guardianship, 172 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
"'The history of past misdeeds towards and mishandlings of person and property of alleged
incompetents has too often been so offensive to the conscience of man that today we revolt
against any thing or occasion that could even resemble the past. We readily suspect that were this
not the case, many feeble- or weak-minded persons could be incarcerated in a mental institution
and be prevented from the exercise of their own free will over their own possessions ....
Id. at 108.
" Curran, supra note 8, at 276. The judicial attitLwde which often led to the abuse of the
commitment process is exemplified in Martin v. Beuter, 79 W. Va. 604. 91 S.E. 452 (1917),
in which the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vest Virginia, addressing itself to a statute which
permitted guardianship as an alternative to commitment, stated that such a provision was
not to be considered a mere means of regaining liberty, for insane persons "'have no
constitutional or statutory right of liberty in the ordinary sense of the term." 79 W. Va. at
607, 91 S.E. at 453-54; accord, Maxwell v. Maxwell, 189 Iowa 7. 177 N.W. 541 (1920) (the
right to restrain an insane person is not governed by the general law which provides that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law). See generally
Weihofen, Conmindinent of Mental Patients- Proposals to Eliminate Some Unhappy
Features oJ Our Legal Procedure, 13 ROCKY MT. LAw REv. 99, 105-06 (1941). An
unfortunate aspect of borrowing procedural devices from the criminal process is that it has
often "resulted in statutes that do more to prevent witch hunts than to aid the mentally ill,
that handcuff psychiatrists, and that brand the patient with the stigma attendant upon a
public trial employing terminology common to criminal prosecution." Project, Civil Commit-
ment of the Mentally Ill, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 822, 824-25 (1967).
1: 1961 Hearings. supra note 2, at I, 2.
' See. e.g., In re Fehl, 159 Ore. 545, 81 P.2d 130 (1938) (in lunacy inquisition, the
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of the specific patient have been developed, thus evidencing a
legislative sensitivity for the traumatic effect which formal
proceedings may have on the person.17 However, this trend toward
more informal, administrative proceedings has not had the
prophylactic effect hoped for, and commitment in most states
remains "unsound, archaic, and even vicious in . . . operation."'"
The combination of police, jail and court has been recognized as
capable of inflicting incalculable harm on the patient and gravely
impeding his chances of recovery.t0
Once inside the institution the patient's plight often worsens"20
due in part to the overcrowding of existing facilities created by the
annual admission of more than 500,000 people-approximately
ninety percent of whom are committed through the compulsory
process. t Furthermore, in spite of varying approaches taken by the
individual states, no state mental health system today meets the
defendant is not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of law). See generally Curran, supra note
8. Most jurisdictions, however, have chosen not to eliminate the use of jury trials during
commitment proceedings, but rather have made its availability dependent upon the request of
the patient or his counsel. See ILL REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 9-2 (1967) (patient, his spouse,
any relative or friend, or an attorney appearing for any of them may demand a jury trial on
the question of need for mental treatment); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5547-48 (1957) (jury
trial if not waived, or on demand by proposed patient or his attorney). See also Swinford v.
Logue, 313 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (denial of jury trial upon original
commitment for mental illness or in restoration hearing is unconstitutional).
1t In Illinois, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2- § 9-4 (1967), and Texas, TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT.
art. 5547-49, presence at the commitment hearing is made discretionary with the patient.
Other jurisdictions permit the holding of the hearing in a place other than a courtroom, a
provision which tempers the inquisitorial nature of the proceeding and makes it a less
traumatic experience for the patient. Presently twenty-five states allow the hearing to be held
at any place selected by the court. 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 822, supra note 14. at 852, 874-75.
"1 1961 Hearings. supra note 2, at 43. Some writers, adhering to the familiar "'due
process" arguments, have contended that a few legislatures have gone too far in
"liberalizing" admission procedures to mental institutions. One such critique was leveled at
the 1960 amendments to section 73(a) of the New York State Mental Hygiene Law. This
legislation permitted commitment without a court order without requiring verified petitions.
The critic called for a re-examination of the trend away from judicial-like safeguards.
DeCain, Connitient Procedures and he Non-Mentally I11, 33 N.Y.S.B.J. 151 (1961).
11 1961 Hearings. supra note 2, at 43.
1 "'Recent studies . . . attest to the continuance of the stripping of the patient, loss of his
individuality, and dignity, depersonalization, and demoralization. The chronically acute
shortage of physicians in most wards makes the term 'psychotherapy' a hideous mockery for
most patients." Id.
21 LNDNtA,' & MCINYRE. supra note I, reviewed, Curran, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1252, 1253
(1962). Each year, more than one million patients are treated in mental institutions, which is
more than five times the prison population. As a result, more than half of all available
hospital beds are presently occupied by mental patients. 1961 Hearings. supra note 2. at 329.
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minimum staffing and facility requirements set by the American
Psychiatric Association.2
Finally, in addition to the physical deficiencies of present
systems, public opinion concerning mental illness, replete with
beliefs reminiscent of the colonial experience, presents further
difficulties. The inefficacy of statutory relabeling in the past few
years should be sufficient indication that a mere reconstruction of
psychiatric or statutory nosology will not eradicate the stigma
which has attached to mental illness and institutionalization.23
Greater advances can be made if emphasis is placed on the creation
of humane hospitalization laws2 which would not only provide the
requisite protection for society, but would also accord with the
limited resources presently available and be sensitive to the unique
needs of the individual. Through an analysis of the existing
inadequacies of the American mental health system, this comment,
in addition to assessing the present stature of the commitment
process, will critically review the current legislative, and judicial
thought surrounding the rights of the mentally ill during
incarceration.
THE COMPULSORY COMMITMENT PROCESS
Philosophical Bases
Although an individual is not subject to imprisonment until his
criminal transgression is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, ' 3
sovereign power has been exercised for centuries to confine the
mentally ill through procedures which demonstrate a negligible
= As of 1958, it was noted that only 15 states had more than 50.c of the total number of
physicians needed to staff the public mental hospitals according to APA standards. On the
national average registered nurses are calculated to be only 19.4% adequate, social workers
36.4%, and psychologists 65%. Solomon, The American Psychiatric Association in Relation
to American Psychlatry, 115 A.. J. PSYCHIATRY I, 7 (1958). In the ten years since that
report the number of patients in mental institutions has increased by 18"t, without an
equivalent increase in physician staffing. Curran, Conmntunitr Mental Health and the
Commitment Laws: A Radical New Approach is Needed, 57 A.h J. PUBLIC HEALTH AND
THE NATION'S HEALTH 1565 (1967). An enlightening treatment of current manpower needs
and possible sources for the future is presented in Kubic, The Overall Manpower Problem In
Mental Health Personnel, 144 J. OF NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 466 (1967). The author
suggests -middle-older" people as an untapped source.
1 SeeT. SzAsz, LAw, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 18-36 (1963).
21 Curran, supra note 8, at 289.
21 See. e.g., United States v. Greene, 146 F. 803 (S.D. Ga. 1906).
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degree of rigor. Much like criminal imprisonment, commitment
entails the restriction or loss of basic civil liberties and subjection
to the regimens of custody and control.-'  Unlike imprisonment,
commitment primarily serves medically therapeutic, non-punitive
purposes, and theoretically physical control is utilized only when
necessary to further treatment. Thus, some of the justifications for
commitment for mental illness necessarily differ from the reasons
which support imprisonment. Today, two grounds, often
indistinguishable in statutes and judicial construction,2  are most
often cited to support state-imposed civil confinement. The first
rationale, the notion of parens patriae,2 is based on society's right,
if not its duty, to care for those persons who because of their
mental disorders are incapable of caring for themselves.29 The
second ground, that of police power, 30 is based on a theory of
preventive detention-that some persons, though innocent of any
criminal act, are considered so dangerous that they must be
- Deinitionally, "commitment- in the context of this comment refers to compulsory or
involuntary dentention in an institution designated as a mental hospital. See SzAsz, supra
note 23, at 39. Such commitments are typically of the judicial variety, and can be further
broken down into two classes: "immediate, issuing out of a magistrate's court, and formal.
arising in . the general court of original jurisdiction." S. PEARLSTEIN, PSYCHIATRY, THE
LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH 62-64 (1967).
Although possessing punitive elements, it should be remembered that imprisonment
theoretically serves rehabilitative purposes as well. See generally Weihofen, Treatment of
Insane Prisoners. 1960 ILL. L.F. 524.
2 Comment, Civil Restraint. Mental Illness. and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87
(1967).
SE.g., Hook v. Simes. 98 N.H. 280, 98 A.2d 165 (1953) (inquiry into the competency of a
person and the appointment of a guardian is a proceeding by the state in its character of
parens patriae, based on its interest in the welfare of the alleged incompetent); United States ex
rel. Grove v. Jackson, 16 F. Supp. 126 (M.D. Pa. 1936) (it is fundamental that the state is
parens patriae of the insane).
The necessity for distinguishing between psychologically-based mental disorders and
those of a physiological origin has been ably dealt with by Thomas Szasz. T. SzAsz, THE
MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961).
Szasz has noted elsewhere that "[t[he expression 'mental illness' is a metaphor which we
have come to mistake for a fact. We call people physically ill when their body-functioning
violates certain anatomical and physiological norms; similarly, we call people mentally ill
when their personal conduct violates certain ethical, political, and social norms." T. SzAsz,
LAw. LIBERTY AND PSCHIATRY 17 (1963).
0 E.g., Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235, 39 A. 169 (1898) (insanity proceedings are an
exercise of the police powers of the state). See generally Ross, Conmitment of the Mentally
Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945, 954-60 (1960); Note, Civil
Comuituent of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1288 (1966);
77 YALE L.J. 87, supra note 27.
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restrained to protect society or themselvesY Confinement is thereby
utilized to protect society against a probability of prospective harm,
a restraint which seems constitutionally justified only so long as the
danger exists02
From these sources of state power to commit and confine, the
courts and legislatures have developed three standard criteria for
involuntary commitment. Dangerousness, a direct derivative of
police power, is a legal basis for commitment in fourteen states"
Perhaps the greatest difficulty under this criterion lies in
determining what degree or type of behavior should make a
person's freedom unacceptable and therfore statutorily
"dangerous. 'a 4 While recidivism and repeated acts of violence
present viable measures, such standards, legislatively designed to
facilitate uniform application, thus far have not been forthcoming.
Furthermore, if the ideas of preventive detention fostered under
these "dangerousness" criteria are to be logically consistent, some
means for determining a person's potential for antisocial acts must
be developed. Once harm has been inflicted, it would appear that
much of the justification for the use of such civil commitment
statutes has disappearedVa Thus, subtle, before-the-fact criteria will
31 See 77 YALE L.J. 87, supra note 27.
'1 See Ross, supra note 30, at 956. The connotative differences between the partens patriae
and the police power bases for commitment have been recently explored. "Preventive
detention sounds bad; it conflicts with our traditions and seems constitutionally dubious. Our
natural reaction is that if we are to allow such restraint at all the occasions for it must be
carefully defined-as the elements of a crime usually are- and it must be implemented under
procedures which assure careful protection for the rights of the person affected.
"'Treatment, on the other hand, sounds good; when we restrain a man to treat him, we act
for his own benefit; we decide for him as we assume he would decide for himself it he were of
sound mind. With benevolent intent assumed, definition of standards and procedural
protections seem less important." 77 YALE L.J. 87, supra note 27.
'See 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 822, supra note 14, at 822, 872-73 (1967) (the fourteen states
which have statutes based on dangerousness are Arizona. California, Connecticut, Florida,
Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Utah and Washington).
"See 79 HARv. L. REv. 1288, supra note 30, at 1291.
'As to the use of 'recidivism" as a guide see Dodd v. Hughes, 81 Nev. 43, 398 P.2d 540
(1965), in which the court declared its doubts "that the legislature ever intended medical
classifications to be the sole guide for judicial commitment . . . . Recidivism, repeated acts
of violence, the failure to respond to conventional penal and rehabilitative measures, and
public safety, are additional and relevant considerations for the court in deciding whether a
person is mentally ill." 81 Nev. at 46, 398 P.2d at 542. On the question ofstatutory standards
see Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Connitentt, 117 U. PA. L.
REv. 75 (1968).
= Following the occurrence of a substantial antisocial act such as a crime, society may
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have to be developed before these statutes can fulfill their intended
purpose. Neither a post-hoe nor "gut-reaction" approach should be
accepted. Following a similar line of reasoning one commentator
has suggested that a rigorous test of potential dangerousness
combined with a "clear and convincing" standard of proof might
be the most valuable approach "Yr Thus, antisocial tendencies of
psychological origin would have to be heavily documented and
medically supported to indicate such a Weltanschauung that
commitment would become a statutory necessity.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1845 suggested
a second criterion for involuntary hospitalization-the patient's
need for care and treatmentY5 The increasing popularity of this
standard is no doubt due to its idealistic connotations. From the
very best of motives, society desires to alter an aberrant person's
behavior and bring him closer to the "norm." 39 Unfortunately,
involuntary commitment achieved under such a standard may
unwittingly be reduced to an almost summary process because of
such good intentions. Therefore, to protect against wrongful
commitments, exacting definitions of what constitutes a "need for
treatment" are necessary.0 Presently, a number of statutes which
prescribe commitment on this basis are poorly and ambiguously
worded,." and courts have been forced to rely heavily on inaccurate
confine the mentally ill who are dangerous, even though acquitted from criminal chargq due
to "insanity," through the exercise of police power and for the protection of society. See
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE STUDY OF COMMITMENT PROCEDURES AND THE LAW RELATING
TO INCOMPETENTS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. MENTAL
ILLNESS. DUE PROCESS. AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT (1968) [hereinafter cited SPECIAL
STUDY].
See 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1288, supra note 30, at 1291.
"In re Oakes. 8 Law Rep. 122 (Mass. 1845).
"'When faced with an obviously aberrant person, we know, or we think we know, that he
would be 'happier' if he were as we are. We believe that no one would want to be a misfit in
society." Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 35, at 87.
1 See generally Ross, supra note 30, at 956-64.
41 The main difficulty with the "need for treatment" criterion is that, like dangerousness, it
states a condition in conclusory terms without enumerating the requisites for such a
determination. However, unlike dangerousness, which can be measured in objective terms
such as recidivism (see note 35 supra and accompanying text), "need for treatment" presents
no such extrinsic aids. Furthermore, the ease with which one can be classified as less than
mentally healthy, and the difficulty in distinguishing degrees of illness, make it doubtful that
anyone possesses sufficient ability to judge when the line between minimum socialization and
aesthetically pleasing acculturation has been passed. See Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl.
supra note 35, at 94-95.
A statute in point is the Iowa provision for the commitment of mentally ill persons, which
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psychiatric classificatory schemes.42 Further problems develop when
states that hospitalization may follow if a physician's report demonstrates that the person is
"mentally ill and in need of treatment." IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1 (Supp. 1969). Under
such broad statutory language, commitment may often depend on the particular school-
orientation of the examining physician. As a result, different consequences may follow, not
due to statutory variation, but rather due to the philosophical variations among physicians.
Thus, it has been suggested that because "[pisychiatry is primarily an art rather than a
science, [and] [i]n order to emphasize to the participants in the decision making process that
the questions are essentially social, the statutes defining mental illness should be phrased in
non-psychiatric terms and the expert witnesses should be required to testify in terms of social
facts and predictions rather than in psychiatric terms." Ross,.supra note 30, at 961, 963.
Furthermore, mere conclusory statements of an individual's condition, though phrased in
statutorily-prescribed terms, should not be permitted to obscure the necessity for a
substantial basis for institutionalization. Inquiry into the probability of successful treatment,
the probable duration of confinement, and the specific examples of indicative symptoms and
behavior should be made before the otherwise meaningless statutory criterion of "need for
treatment" is invoked. In addition, the individual should be accorded ample opportunity to
rebut "state expert witnesses" by-being provided with medical representation of his own. See
notes 91-97 infra and accompanying text. In an area as undefined as this, the "patient"
should be able to effectively challenge those who rely on statutorily-provided conclusions
such as a "need for treatment."
4 To understand the complexities facing any court which receives psychiatric testimony in
the professional "parlance" one need only refer to HINSIE & CAMPBELL'S PSYCHIATRIC
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1960) in which literally scores of supposed mental maladies are given
such nomenclature as confabulation (the act of replacing memory loss by phantasy or by
reality that is not true for the occasion); hysteria (characteristic features of which are a
physical manifestation without structural lesion and dissociation of mental and bodily func-
tions); schizophrenia (commonly known as the split-personality syndrome); and the more com-
mon terms of id, ego, superego, neurosis, psychosis, functional psychosis, complexes and so on.
The artificiality of such conceptual nosology becomes abundantly clear when one considers the
differing import given these conditions by classical psychoanalysis, the interpersonal school,
the cultural school, individual psychology, analytical psychology, the behaviorists, and the
group therapists. For example, whereas the typical classical Freudian views aberrant behavior
as merely symptomatic, and indicative of an underlying disorder, the behaviorist would view the
symptoms themselves as the disorder and believe that alleviation of the behavioral "aberrancy"
will eliminate the disorder itself, and that no underlying disorder in fact exists. See S. PEARL-
STEIN, PSYCHIATRY, THE LAW.AND MENTAL HEALTH (I96S).
"One need only glance at the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association
to learn what an elastic concept mental illness is. It ranges from the massive functional
inhibition characteristic of one form of catatonic schizophrenia to those seemingly slight
aberrancies associated with an emotionally unstable personality, but which are so close to
conduct in which we all engage as to define the entire continuum involved. Obviously, the
definition of mental illness is left largely to the user and is dependent upon the norms of
adjustment that he employs. Usually the use of the phrase 'mental illness' effectively masks
the actual norms being applied. And, because of the unavoidably ambiguous generalities in
which the American Psychiatric Association describes its diagnostic categories, the
diagnostician has the ability to shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost any person
he wishes, for whatever reason, to put there." Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, suipra note
35, at 80. See also Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A KniJ' that Cuts Both
Ways, TRIAL, Feb.-Mar. 1968, at 29.
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the propriety of commitment for purposes of treatment is
considered in the context of present institutional conditions 3
Arguably, if the theory of curative commitment is to be
constitutionally valid, the validity of any particular commitment
must depend on whether the person will receive proper and
substantial care and treatment while hospitalized. Modern
experience indicates that this requisite is seldom fulfilled.4
A third criterion for commitment, though the least prevalent, is
that of welfare of self or others, and ranks as the most ambiguous
and difficult standard to apply.'5 Whereas statutes which adopt the
dangerousness criterion are often complemented by the inclusion of
the need for treatment standard,4  welfare is sufficiently broad to
absorb both standards and more.27 Obviously, such a broad rubric
can accommodate both police power and parens patriae bases. But
such language, due to its ambiguity, may be unusually susceptible
to abuses, such as the attempted commitment of persons by
unscrupulous relatives or business associates for personal gain or
benefit 5 and the aggravation of institutional deficiencies due to
increased numbers of commitments. 9
In light of these considerations, it is not surprising that the law
See Kubic. supra note 22.
"See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.AJ. 499 (1960). "The principal barriers
to effective treatment are inadequate financing, an acute shortage of hospital beds and
equipment, in some states a poorly designed administrative structure for the state hospital
system, and most of all, lack of trained personnel." Ross, supra note 30, at 1001-02.
" As of 1967, eight states had statutes which made provision for the issuance of a
hospitalization order if it was found that such commitment was necessary for the welfare of
the person himself or others. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 45, § 205 (1959): "A person shall be
adjudged insane who has been found by a proper court sufficiently deficient or defective
mentally to require that, Jor his ot'n or others' weilare, he be moved to the insane hospital
for restraint, care and treatment." [Emphasis added.]
£See notes 38-44 supra and accompanying text.
IT For example, those persons suffering from a disease of the aged-such as a cerebro-
vascular disease and accompanying cerebral impairment (senility) - -may well be candidates for
incarceration for their "own welfare" while being neither dangerous nor treatable. It would
seem that if the state wishes to intervene in such cases it should do so in a manner which
does not involve a total loss of freedom. The desire to "'help" ought not to take the form of
simple jailing. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), for one court's opinion
as to remedial alternatives to jailing in such a case.
',See. e.g., In re Lugo's Guardianship, 172 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Ct. Cf. 1958).
"The District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally IlI Act, see notes 98-100 & 113
htJra and accompanying text, indirectly decreased institution population by restricting
commitment to "dangerous" mentally ill. See Note. The District oJ Columbia
Hospitalization oJ the Mlentally Ill Act, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1062. 1069 (1965).
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of involuntary commitment is confused and contradictory when the
desire to obtain treatment for sick persons conflicts with the need to
prevent unjust deprivations of liberty 0 However, only through a
weighing of such conflicting policy considerations will valid
definitional and functional criteria for commitment be developed.
These goals, though incompatible in many respects, are not
mutually exclusive. Idealistic connotations should not be permitted
to obscure the difficult constitutional and other legal problems
confronted when state action seeks to deprive an individual of his
liberty.
Procedural Devices
Developments in commitment legislation since 1860 have
borrowed heavily from the criminal law as a procedural model: The
older commitment statutes demand sworn complaints, jury trials,
open court hearings, and the recitation of formal charges.5t Under
these laws, "the walls around the mental hospitals were built
high. 15 2 Although formidable obstacles were created to prevent
improper admissions, little notice was taken that such statutes also
made it difficult to get out, and thus, institutions often became
custodial warehouses, especially for psychotics from the lower socio-
-* It has been noted that commitment, as a form of social control, necessarily involves
certain policy considerations which must be considered with respect to the constitutional and
statutory bases for compulsory hospitalization. Some or the principal policy questions have
been isolated: (I) "he degree or type of social-adaptive failure which should be required to
justify hospitalization against the wishes of the individual; (2) how this standard should be
incorporated in legal procedures so that the policy reasons behind the standard will be
effectuated and the individual still protected against unwarranted deprivation of his liberty;
and (3) the effect, if any, that compulsory hospitalization should have on the legal rights of
the individual, other than his loss of personal liberty. Ross, supra note 30, at 955.
"'Different considerations are present when commitment is not based on the need to treat.
If one is committed as dangerous, or as a nuisance, or as unable to care for oneself, and
treatment can cure this condition, then it is easier to strike the balance between deprivation
of liberty and the right to refuse treatment in favor of compulsory treatment. If told that this
is the price or freedom, the patient may accede; if he prefers confinement to treatment,
perhaps the state ought not to override his wishes. But at least in this situation the question
is ethically a close one.
'The difficulty with present commitment procedures is that they tend to justify all
commitments in terms that are appropriate only to some, and to prescribe forms of
treatment that are necessary in only some cases." Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl, supra
note 35, at 95.
" Curran, Comntunity Mental Health and the Commtitnnent Laws: .4 Radical Aen'.
Approach Is .Veeded, 57 Axi. J. OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE NATION'S HEALTH 1565 (1967)
I ld. at 1566.
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economic classes53 Following this period of custody rather than
cure, attention was directed away from criminalistic terminology
and jury trials, and reforms permitting easier access to mental
hospitals became increasingly popular. This newly focused concern
resulted in 1950 in a "Draft Act" composed under the auspices of
the National Advisory Mental Health Council and submitted to the
state governors.54 More recently, legislation has developed which
recognizes the difficulty of gaining freedom from the mental
hospital.5
Yet, despite this continuing evolution of commitment law, none
of the existing statutes make a radical break with the basic
structure of the "Packard Laws." ' All prescribe rigid procedures
for commitment and sacrifice even a limited flexibility to meet
individual needs in order to codify precise methods of handling all
patients. "-7 The variations in methodology which apparently
distinguish between states' procedural approaches are often
superficial and are more realistically seen as idiosyncracies in a few
basic commitment schemes s58 Moreover, since few problems in this
Id. (Curran notes that the deficiencies under the early systems were especially harsh on the
poor, and "the larger the hospital, the worse the conditions.")
•1 A DRAFT AcT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL. U.S. Public
Health Service, Publication No. 51, rev. ed. (1952) [hereinafter cited as Draft Act]. For a
summary of the act see Felix, Hospitalization of the Mentally III, 107 AMt. J. PSYCHIATRY
712 (1951). By the end of 1957, ten states had adopted the Draft Act in whole or in part. See
Ross, supra note 30, at 948.
The Draft Act eliminated criminalistic terminology and jury trials, and advocated voluntary
admission and adoption of a nonjudicial procedure under which a patient could be confined
without notice or a chance to protest before a court or other tribunal. Constitutional rights
were ostensibly protected by the right to protest after confinement. Curran, supra note 22, at
1566.
r In several states judicial commitment may be challenged through appeal, e.g., CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-202 (1958), GA. CODE ANN. § 88-16060j) (1963), ILL REV. STAT.
ch. 91 1/2, § 2-3 (Supp. 1968), IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.17 (Supp. 1968), MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 246.55 (Supp. 1968); or through a special form of judicial review, e.g., N.D. REV.
CODE § 25-03-17 (1959), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 75 (Supp. 1968), TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. art. 5547-53 to -54 (1958); or at least through an enlarged habeas corpus hearing
with opportunity to review the patient's mental condition at the time of hospitalization or at
any subsequent occasion, e.g., S.D. CODE § 30.0111 (1939).
See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
See Curran, supra note 51, at 1567.
" Despite the apparent uniformity which exists among the state statutes, procedures for
compulsory hospitalization are divisible into three basic patterns. The distinguishing feature
is the agency that has final responsibility for the determination of the need for commitment
and the making of the commitment order. Thirty-four states require a judicial hearing and
the issuance of an order before commitment may be made. While not departing from the
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field are projected beyond state boundaries, uniform legislation,
often a cure for the statutory inadequacies of a federal system, is
not necessarily a proper solution for the deficiencies of mental
health laws. 51 However, it has been noted that the impact of
commitment on legal capacity to contract, and the increased
number of Veterans Administration patients, most of whom are
committed under state statutes, indicate a need for some degree of
uniformity.6
The Due Process Consideration. Historically, arguments have
been offered that the introduction of strict formalities has made
treatment less accessible and retarded the development of the
mental health sytem.6' However, much has been written in recent
years on the effectiveness of various procedural methodologies in
preserving due process' Although the present trend is toward more
relaxed and less technical quasi-judicial and administrative
procedures, several authorities have persisted in arguing that the
incorporation of legal principles into this area is of great
importance and that legal guarantees are necessary whenever
society sets out to deprive its members of their liberty or property,
whether in criminal or commitment cases.63
requirement of a hearing, seven other states provide that such hearing be held before a
nonjudicial tribunal consisting of legal and medical experts and lay representatives. In
fifteen states commitment may be effectuated without a prior hearing before an independent
tribunal. Kittrie, supra note 5, at 38. Several states have more than one of these procedures.
-1 As to the desirability of uniform legislation among the states in respect to the
hospitalization of the mentally ill, the American Bar Association's special committee on the
rights of the mentally ill has concluded that the subject of commitment does not
advantageously lend itself to a uniform state law. See Ross, supra note 30, at 947.
'*See 1961 Hearings. supra note 2. at 349-55.
' The most frequently stated objections to the present structure and operation of
compulsory hospitalization laws are: (1) present commitment procedures resemble criminal
proceedings and have a traumatic effect on the patient; (2) the taint of criminality is at least
partially responsible for adverse public attitude toward mental illness; (3) the medical question
of hospitalization has been improperly delegated to judicial officers; and (4) present admission
procedures are cumbersome and discourage early and speedy treatment. See Kittrie. supra
note 5, at 46. See also Kutner, The Illusion oJ Due Process bt Conunitnent Proceedings. 57
Nw. U. L. RE%. 383 (1963).
6-See. e.g. J. KATZ. J. GOLDSrEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ. PSCHOANALYSIS. PSYCHIATRY AND
LAW (1967); T. SZasz. LAW. LIERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963): Arens. Due Process and the
Rights oJ the Mentally Ill 13 CATH. U.L. REv. 3 (1964); Kittrie, supra note 5. at 28;
Kutner, supra note 61. at 383; Ross. supra note 30, at 945; Szasz, C7vil Liberties and the
Mentally Ill, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 399 (1960); Note, Due Process or A.lll-Constlittional
StandardsJor Inrolutary Civil Conuitment and Release. 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 633 (1963);
Note, The New Mental Health Codes: Sajeguards in Compulsory Conmitment and Release.
61 Nw. U.L. REv. 977 (1967).
6 See Kittrie. supra note 5, at 28-3 1.
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The basis of the due process argument is the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause. Despite the variety which exists
among commitment procedures, most state statutes, through
devices such as notice, hearings and jury trials, provide a degree of
due process for the mentally ill analogous to that safeguarding the
criminal defendant. This near-unanimity among the statutes is
surprising when one considers that many of the constitutional
questions in this area have never been decided. For example,
although several courts have held that the requirements of due
process are generally satisfied only if commitment is made after
notice and hearing,64 it is still undetermined whether the giving of
notice to the alleged mentally ill of the initiation of commitment
proceedings is a constitutional requisite. 5 It would appear,
however, that so long as a judicial methodology is retained in
commitment law, logical consistency requires the giving of
sufficient notice to enable the individual to benefit fully from other
safeguards in the system.66
Though statutorily defined, modes of notice presently provided
for are of dubious efficacy. -A number of state statutes provide that
if medical examiners certify that notice to the patient would be
harmful, the court may in its discretion omit such notice
altogether. Other jurisdictions, though requiring personal notice to
6 The doctrine that substantial rights could not be impaired without an opporuntity being
given the person to present his case was adopted by the Supreme Court in Simon v. Craft,
182 U.S. 427 (1901), and became generally accepted as a procedural necessity. See Kittrie,
supra note 5, at 44.
61 See. e.g., Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235, 39 A. 169 (1893); Olsen v. MacFeely, 202 Ga.
146, 42 S.E.2d 366 (1947); Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Liberty National Bank &
Trust Co., 180 Ga. 4, 177 S.E. 803 (1934); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 189 Iowa 7, 177 N.W. 541
(1920) (all permitting exception to notice requirements); but cf. Evans v. Johnson, 39 W. Va.
299, 19 S.E. 623 (1894) (notice constitutionally required).
96 It is apparent that the denial of one right can have the effect of reducing related
statutory or constitutional rights to a nullity. For example, the right to counsel, though
constitutionally derived under the sixth and fourteenth amendment, will be relatively
worthless as a procedural safeguard if the defendant is not notified of the charge and his
right to procure counsel within sufficient time to permit the adequate preparation of his case.
Thus, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that -'[the
suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning, that he. .. has the right to the presence
of an attorney. ... Id. at 479.
I- The states include Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, South
Caroline..Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. See 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 822, supra note 14, at
872-73. See also Weihofen & Overholser, Connitment of the Menially III, 24 TEX. L. REv. 307.
340 (1946).
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be served on the person or his guardian, permit service to be made
only a day or two before the date of hearings, thus converting the
notice requirement into a hollow guarantee 5
Similarly, hearings designed to determine whether involuntary
commitment is justified vary in efficacy and formality among the
jurisdictions. A major cause of the existing variation is the number
of concessions which have been made in response to medical
opinion. These have tended to dilute the procedural formalism
customarily attendant to legal proceedings.69 For example, under
the District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally III Act,70
the subject's presence at the hearing is not required.7 Other states
authorize the holding of the hearing at any place selected by the
court or commission,72 while attempting to draw away from the
adversary nature of the proceeding. In California, for example,
relatives and friends of the individual are encouraged to accompany
him to the hearing and to reassure him during the course of
proceedings, and no "prosecuting attorney" is present during the
hearing?"a In this manner the "opportunity to be heard" permits a
more objective investigation by the court itself, while lessening the
possible traumatic impact on the individual.
As indicated above, the status of jury trials in the commitment
scheme is insecure at best.74 Nevertheless, a number of state
constitutions make provision for a jury trial in commitment
proceedings if the patient requests, even though "there is no
federally guaranteed right to jury trial in civil cases in state
courts."75 Despite these provisions the use of such tribunals is of
" See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 8-3 (1965) (at least one day before the time ror
examination as set by the court, a copy of the petition for admission must be "personally
delivered to the person" and to the nearest relatives).
"See 196 1* Hearings. supra note 2. at 330.
0 D.C. CODE § 21-501 (1967).
.1 Id. § 21-542(a).
-See. e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2. § 9-1 (1967); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5547-49
(Supp. 1968).
7 CAL. WELI.. & INST'XS CODE §§ 5563, 5564 (1967). 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 822. supra
note 14, at 852.
7' "Because a hearing for compulsory hospitalization is not a criminal proceeding, the
sixth amendment [apparently] does not . . . require a jury trial. . . . State and federal
courts, in construing provisions of their own constitutions [similar to that of the seventh
amendment's jury trial guarantee], have ariived at differing conclusions." 61 Nw. U.L. REV.,
supra note 62, at 97.7. 1000-01.
14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 822, supra note 14, at 857 (1967). See. eg., Fay v. New York, 332
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doubtful value, particularly when the possible traumatic effects of
the proceeding are considered.76 In addition, the lay jury seems
"peculiarly unsuited for evaluating psychiatric testimony and [is]
more likely to commit unjustly than judges sitting alone."1
Finally, the retention of criminal-like proceedings is of little aid to
efforts to remove the stigma attached to mental illness by the
patient and society 8 These factors, coupled with the adverse view
which the medical profession takes toward the judicial commitment
process in general and juries in particular,79 outweigh any due
process value which a jury might lend to the commitment process.
It has been suggested that the best system would be to permit a
jury trial where a patient, informed by civil authorities of his rights
and advised by counsel or his guardian ad litem, specifically
requests it, but to require a special verdictY0 However, the worthy
objective of lessening the impact of the proceeding on the individual
could be advanced more completely by eliminating the use of jury
trials altogether. The most obvious suggestion would be to replace
the judge and jury by a medical-legal board with power of
commitment,st which would conduct the hearing but would not
necessarily be vested with "all-or-nothing" powers. Rather,
statutory provision could be made to enable the board to prescribe
some form of temporary, limited or out-patient treatment in
addition to indefinite commitment. This determination would be
made after hearing the respective arguments of the proponents of
commitment and the patient's counsel. Thus, greater attention
would be paid to the medical needs of the individual with little or
no sacrifice of effective legal safeguards.
U.S. 261, 288 (1947): Barry v. Hall. 98 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (insanity not a crime and
therefore constitutional guarantee of jury trial not applicable).
,'See T. SzAsz. supra note 23. at 159-68: Kutner, supra note 61: 1961 Hearings. supra
note 2. at 74-79 (statement of Dr. Jack Ewalt, Representative, American Psychiatric
Association).
14 U.C.L.A.L. RLv. 822, supra note 14, at 858. See generally Weihofen. supra note 14.
, See note 76 supra (statement of Dr. Ewalt).
-1 It has been observed that -[m]ost medical authorities state that the optional jury trial is
unnecessary to protect the sane and is undesirable because a jury can be fooled by a paranoiac
who can be lucid and convincing during the trial." Ross, supra note 30, at 970.
' Id. The special verdict is utilized for commitment proceedings in Texas, TL-x. REv. Civ.
STAT. AN\. art. 5547-51 (1958); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. A\*. § 51.03 (1957).
" The creation of a medical-legal board is provided for under the District of Columbia
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act. Act or Sept. 15. 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-597. 78 Stat.
944. D.C. Coi: § 21-502 (1967). However, power ofcommitment is in the court.
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An additional consideration in the preservation of due process is
the adequacy of representation offered by existing statutes.
Throughout the history of judicial commitment, courts and
legislatures have been adamant in asserting that "an adjudication
of insanity is not an adversary proceeding." 2 Nevertheless, the
machinery of the commitment process is set in motion only when
an individual is "accused" of suffering from mental illness 3
Therefore, this analogy between criminal law and civil commitment
would seem to require that a person threatened with involuntary
psychiatric hospitalization be accorded much the same protection
as would be his if accused of a crime, including the assistance of
counsel. As of 1967 thirty states statutorily provided for a right to
counsel in commitment cases, and fifteen of these made
appointment of counsel mandatory in the case of an indigent
person.n5 Yet glaring inadequacies exist, the most fundamental of
which are ineffective notification of the right to counsel, inadequate
compensation for appointed counsel, and the very limited time
allowed for case preparation under several of the acts.86 Much like
the deficiencies in many of the notice statutes,8 the effectiveness of
legal representation as a protective device may be reduced to a
nullity if these limitations are permitted to exist.
Despite the recognition of the value of legal counsel, a problem
equally important, though legislatively less well-considered, is that of
medical advocacy. Two difficulties arise with respect to psychiatric
testimony. The initial problem is that the psychiatrist is recognized
not as an advocate, but as a neutral intermediary between state and
patient whose function is to advise civil authorities as to the
1 Eg.. In re Phillips, 158 Mich. 155, 160, 122 N.W. 554, 556 (1909); accord. In re
Strom's Guardianship, 205 Minn. 399, 286 N.W. 245 (1939); Hall v. Hall. 122 Neb. 228,
239 N.W. 825 (1932); State ex rel. Davey v. Owen, 133 Ohio St. 96, 12 N.E.2d 144 (1937).
Contra, Sorter v. Austen, 221 Ala. 481, 129 So. 51 (1930) (an inquisition of lunacy is a
proceeding sui generis. partaking of the nature of a civil action, and is an adversary
proceeding).
See generally Szasz, Hospital Refijsal to Release Mental Patient. 9 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REv. 220 (1960).
"Id. at 223.
14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 822,supra note 14, at 876.
' Many commitment statutes are deficient with respect to the time permitted for case
preparation. For example, "[i]n many states notice is served only two or three days prior to
the hearing. This short period is not adequate for a contested hearing ..... Ross, supra
note 30, at 968.
"See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
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individual's mental condition. Secondly, once the psychiatrist for
the state or municipality has made his diagnosis and recommended
commitment, the person is considered "sick." Often the
psychiatrist does not have to prove his allegation either inside or
outside of the court, But the patient, in order to avoid imminent
incarceration, must prove that he is not "sick," a burden of
considerable weight when the person is ignorant of the criteria
utilized by the physician to establish the fact of mental illness. Thus
when no provision is made for medical representation, the patient is
without a counter-diagnostician, a situation comparable to the lack
of defense counsel. The judge, having heard only state-introduced
testimony, cannot be presumed to be completely impartial,
especially if he views the proceeding as in the "best interests" of
the "accused."'" Thus, the person's liberty is jeopardized without
his being accorded the opportunity to adequately challenge his
accusors."
Criticisms of the Quasi-Judicial Process. Such inadequacies of
present attempts to preserve a notion of due process for the
mentally ill during the commitment process indicate that severe
drawbacks exist. The basic question of whether insistence on the
traditional criminal law formalities of due proces.s is the most
effective method for the protection of those "charged" with mental
illness remains unresolved. Existing procedures, in attempting to
placate the divergent views of the medical and legal professions
about mental health, present an unfortunate compromise. In trying
to satisfy both viewpoints, the majority of state legislatures have
thus far developed mental health systems which satisfy neither and
bear most heavily upon the individual subjected to its
inconsistencies. 9'
The insistence of legal scholars that persons threatened with
confinement be given the same procedural safeguards as criminals9 2
arises out of the fear that perfectly sane members of society may
otherwise be "railroaded" into mental institutions in a manner
reminiscent of the pre-Packard period23 Psychiatrists, however,
T. SzAsz, supra note 23, at 408.
"Id.
"Id.
"See Note, Hospitalization oJ the Mentally 111: Due Process and Equal Protection. 35
BROOKLY . L. REV. 187, 187-89 (1969).
-See Kutner, supra note 6 1, at 386.
See. e.g.. Brandt v. Brandt, 297 Ill. App. 306, 17 N.E.2d 535 (1938).
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maintain that excessive formality may do substantial harm to the
mental patientf' Indeed, certain aspects of formal commitment
with which the medical profession strongly disagrees, seem quite
susceptible to deletion without the sacrifice of essential due process
safeguardsY5 The problem is thus two-fold: The legal profession
must be persuaded not to construct commitment procedures which
are medically unreasonable and the medical profession must be
convinced of the necessity for some procedural rigor." Therefore, if
a procedural scheme similar to the judicially-oriented process is
retained, the most effective procedure must strike a balance between
medical and legal considerations- a synthesis which recent
statutory enactments have attempted27
Such a recent statutory reconciliation is the District of
Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally III Act?" which, though
enacted by Congress for the District, was intended as a model for
the states.9 Although the Act seeks to establish a number of
safeguards for the mentally ill who are committed -under court
order, considerable emphasis is placed upon the encouragement of
voluntary admissions. I0" This philosophy represents a national
" Kutner, supra note 61, at 386. The argument of the medical profession that such
excessive formality as jury trials and service of process may do traumatic harm to the
individual has been challenged by the "'legalists" who assert that such a position presupposes
the very fact which is sought to be determined by the hearing- the mental illness of the
"accused.*"
1 It is noted previously that juries may be "'peculiarly" incompetent to decide questions
of sanity. See note 84 supra and accompanying text. Ample proof of this is given by the
Illinois experience immediately after the passage of the "'Packard Laws." under which more
improper commitments occurred than had been the case under any other procedure. See note
14 supra and accompanying text.
' Kutner, supra note 61, at 388.
' This synthesis between medical and legal demands has resulted in less formalized
proceedings which manifest a response to attacks on antiquated mental health laws which
subjected the mentally ill to arrest, public trial, and other unfortunate experiences. One
reason for the changed attitude toward mental illness is that it is no longer viewed us a
moral failure of the person, but rather as a psychological "problem in living." See T.
SzAsz. supra note 23. at 13. However, for such a liberalized approach to be fully successful,
some regulation must be retained to protect individuals against oppressive and unchecked
commitment processes.
11 D.C. CODE §§ 21-501 to -509 (1967) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 15, 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-597, 78 Stat. 944).
' See 65 COLUm. L. REv. 1062, supra note 49 (1965).
' The D.C. Act evidences a legislative decision to encourage voluntary admissions by
providing that the voluntary patient is entitled to release within forty-eight hours of his filing
a written request with the "chief of service." D.C. CODE § 21-353(b) (1967). See 65 COW1i.
L. REv. 1062, supra note 49, at 1062-64.
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trend, for virtually all states presently make voluntary
hospitalization available.' Yet, less than twenty percent of those
admitted to mental hospitals in the United States enter voluntarily.
The reasons for this low figure are public skepticism of the
adequacy of treatment and the possibility of release, as well as the
stigma appurtenant to mental illness and institutionalization.102
As addressed to involuntary commitment, the D.C. Act
represents a well-considered attempt to interweave specific requisites
of due process with legitimate medical concerns. For example, jury
trialst: and the patient's presence at the hearing are made
discretionary with the patient, 04 and any hearing or trial is
conducted in as informal a manner as possible.05 Furthermore, the
location of the hearing is chosen so as to minimize possible
harmful effects upon the patient.', In addition, the class of persons
who by petition may initiate such proceedings is severely
restricted,07 thus limiting the possibility of repeated harassment by
"non-interested" parties.' 8 The original petition is filed with the
mental health commission, t°! not the court, and thus the judicial
process is avoided as long as is practicable. The commission is com-
posed of one lawyer and two physicians"0 and, therefore, is able to
bring a "composite legal-medical mind" to bear upon each individ-
ual case. However, the actual decision to commit is not made by the
commission or any other administrative board, but by the court
itself."'
Another notable aspect of the D.C. Act is the narrow criterion
for "commitability" which it establishes. The individual must be
mentally ill, and because of such illness must be likely to injure
himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty."t 2 The effect of
"165 COLu't. L. Rtiv. 1062, supra note 49, at 1063 & n.6.
" 1961 Hearings. supra note 2. at 2, 5-6. 61.
', D.C. Comi § 21-544 (1967).
WI Id. § 21-542(a).
'Id. § 21-541.
'I Id. § 21-542(a).
, Id. § 21-541.
' See. e.g.. In re Lugo's Guardianship. 172 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
'"The mental health commission is statutorily provided for in D.C. CODE § 21-502
(1967).
110 Id. The Commission is composed of a chairman, who is a member of the bar and presides
at each meeting, and eight physicans who serve two at a time on rotating assignment. Id.
I' Id. § 21-545 (1967).
LIZ Id. § 21-545(b) (1967) (emphasis added).
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this "dangerousness" requirement is both a stricter standard which
decreases the likelihood of improper commitments, and a lower
overall number of admissions which lightens the burden of
overcrowded facilities, since no one merely "in need of treatment"
will be admitted. Although the long-range goal remains the
provision of treatment for all who require it, the D.C. Act, by
recognizing the limitations of presently inadequate staffs and
facilities, and by diminishing institution population through
decreased admissions, presents at least a realistic approach to the
problem.' 3
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL DURING INCARCERATION
Experience demonstrates that too often public and legislative
concern for the rights of the mentally ill has ceased at the asylum
door."' Although the past century has witnessed a substantial effort
and some achievement in the establishment of more just and
"patient-responsive" commitment proceedings, often. those who
enter the hospital are subsequently deprived of even nominal rights
and liberties."3  Near-summary proceedings, which may result in
indefinite incarceration, further magnify the post-commitment
deficiencies of a number of jurisdictions.
In the New York case of Whitree v. State,"' for example, the
claimant had been committed by court order in 1947 after
examination and recommendation by two psychiatrists." 7 In 1968,
"1 It has been suggested that in some areas, such as trial by jury and the form and
manner of notice, "legal considerations have received over-zealous attention by the drafters
to the detriment of the primary goal sought to be achieved- that of providing the best
possible treatment for the mentally ill. while it is desirable to guarantee the patient an
opportunity to fairly contest attempted compulsory hospitalization, marginal procedural
protections with possibly serious results upon the state of his mental health should be
avoided." 65 COLU.%i. L. REV. 1062, supra note 49, at 1074.
" 1961 Hearings. supra note 2. at 330.
"T. SzAszsupra note 23, at 182-89.
' 56"Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
"i Whitree was first arrested on March 25, 1945, on a stabbing charge. He was given a
suspended sentence and placed on probation. There was a violation of probation and he was
taken into custody on April 7, 1947. On April 29, 1947 he was ordered to Bellevue Hospital
for formal psychiatric examination. The technical diagnosis was paranoid condition in a
chronic alcoholic. On May 15, 1947, he was committed to Mattewan State Hospital by
order of the General Sessions court. It is to be noted that the maximum period of a sentence
for either of the above offenses was three years. Whitree in fact was incarcerated by eleven
years more than the criminal term he could have received. Id. at 694-98, 290 N.Y.S.2d at
490-92.
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when the claimant's damage action against the state for wrongful
confinement was finally litigated, the court held that Whitree had
been wrongly confined in the state hospital for almost twelve years
and four months, on the basis of evidence that with proper
psychiatric treatment he should have been released no later than
1949.11s During his first six years of incarceration Whitree received
a total of three in-depth psychological examinations, all during the
first four months."'
One reason for the recurrence of such institutional experiences is
that relatively few actions are brought by mental patients for
improper treatment or illegal detention, even though habeas
corpus' 0 and, possibly, tort remedies' 2' are available. The reasons
for this are manifest. First, the patient is generally unaware of his
rights, and the accessibility of the courts thus goes unrecognized.
Although most statutes provide for personal service of notice of
commitment proceedings, once the person has entered the instituion
the availability of counsel in most states is severely restricted, if
present at all.22 Without such legal assistance the patient, because
of his mental condition or ignorance, will remain unaware of his
statutory and constitutional rights. In this respect, contemporary
mental health faces a dilemma in the dual role of the institutional
psychiatrist, for the psychiatrist, as employee of the state and
I' "On September 25, 1961, after a thorough and complete psychiatric examination at
Bellevue Hospital, Whitree was diagnosed as *Schizoid Personality with Paranoid Features'
and further that 'He is not in such a state of idiocy, imbecility or insanity as to be incapable
or understanding the charge, indictment, proceedings or of making his defense.' One, of
course, must realize that sanity is an area and not a point on a line. The diagnosis was one
that it within socially acceptable behavior, albeit one that most would prefer not to have.
... [ilf this man had received proper and adequate psychiatric treatment such diagnosis
would have been developed much sooner; and Whitree would have been released from
Mattewan State Hospital much sooner." Id. at 706, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
'Id. at 703-05, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 498-99.
I Habeas corpus is available as a remedy to the incarcerated mental patient in a number
of states. See. e.g.. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2. § 10-6 (1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-347
(1951); Tu-x. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5347-85 (1965). In some states, however, the availability of
habeas corpus is dependent upon the exhaustion of other remedies, see. e.g.. NEw YORK
Mi-.rAL HYGIENE LAW § 86 (1951) (available only if administrative remedy is exhausted).
See People v. LaBurt. 17 N.Y.2d 738, 270 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1966).
For an excellent article on the application of habeas corpus to prisoners, see Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Post-Conviciion Remedy or State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv.
461 (1960). See also Note, Constitutional Rights oj Prisoners: the Developing Law. 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
I- See. e.g.. Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1968).
' See 1961 Hearings. supra note 2, at 330-37.
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mindful of the therapeutic and "beneficient" role of the hospital,
simply cannot be depended upon to inform patients of their right to
protest or challenge their hospitalization and treatment123
Secondly, even if the patient is aware of his rights and does seek
redress, he may be substantially hindered by hospital-imposed
restrictions on correspondence, by censorship or by the burden of
proof he must meet to challenge successfully his confinement. In
some states an adjudication of insanity has the effect of "shifting
the burden" so that the adjudged person, in later efforts to regain
his liberty, must affirmatively establish that his disability no longer
exists.124 Even in jurisdictions which provide for the appointment of
counsel for indigent patients seeking release,125 such a burden is
likely to prove insurmountable, especially when the expense and
difficulty of procuring expert psychiatric testimony on the patient's
behalf is considered.
Judicial and Legislative attention has been increasingly directed
toward the definition and protection of the legal and medical rights
and status of the committed person. In some mental health codes
provisions have been incorporated which preserve certain civil and
medical rights for thie patient, the originator of such an approach be-
ing the federally-constructed Draft Act of 1951.126 Similar, but ex-
panded, codifications of patient rights are found in the California
Mental Health Act of 1967,127 the Idaho Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill Act of 1951,18 and the 1967 revision of the Texas
Mental Health Code.129 .
However, because of the national character of the enacting body
and the depth of the research involved in its preparation, the most
important of the recent mental health codes is the District of
'ST. SzAsz. supra note 23. at 169-70.
'See. e.g., State v. Bradley, 102 Ariz. 482, 433 P.2d 273 (1963) (prior adjudication of
mental incompetency gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of continued incompetency);
Newton v. Brooks, 246 Ore. 484, 426 P.2d 446 (1967) (person seeking release has the burden
of going forward with the evidence on the issue of his suitability for release). Contra, In re
Conner, 226 A.2d 126 (Del. Ch. 1967) (law presumes every person sane); Waple v. Hall, 248
Md. 642, 238 A.2d 544 (1968) (legal presumption that every person is sane).
'2 See the interpretation of the New York law on appointment of counsel in Greenawalt,
Constitutional Law, 18 SYR. L. REV. 180, 198-200 (1966).
'.. Draft Act. supra note 54, § 19-26. See note 54 supra.
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5325 (1968-69).
' IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 66-344, 66-346 (1967).
' TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5547-86 (1968-69).
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Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act.130 The D.C. Act
specifically provides for the mandatory twice-yearly examination of
patients hospitalized under court order . 3 1 The patient is entitled to
have his own physician participate in the examination, and an
indigent patient may have the assistance of the Department of
Public Health in obtaining a physician to participate in his behalf.
If the physicians' reports lead to a determination by the chief of
service3 2 that the patient is no longer dangerous, his immediate
release must be ordered. 33 Moreover, a contrary determination by
the chief of service does not preclude release, since the patient is
entitled to petition the court for an order of release if one or more
of the examining physicians is of the opinion that the statutory
conditions for confinement no longer exist . 3  The Act, therefore,
not only has taken a significant step to insure the timely release of
persons whose hospitalization is no longer legally justifiable,'- but
also has averted the two major difficulties confronting patients
seeking release: Release is not completely contingent on the
patient's knowledge of its availability, and outside medical
assistance is assured. Nevertheless, it has been noted that the
statute provides only two alternatives-continued hospitalization or
unconditional release,"' and a provision permitting conditional
release, through which patients could be freed from the institution
on the stipulation that they attend out-patient clinics and undergo
periodic examination, has been suggested as a desirable addition.37
170 D.C. Cont. §§ 21-501 to -591 (1967).
1z' hi. § 21-548.
1 The "'chief of service" is the "'physician charged with overall responsibility for the
professional program of care and treatment in the particular administrative unit of the
hospital to which the patient has been admitted or such other member of the medical staff as
the chief of service designates. ... Id. § 21-501 (1967).
M hi. § 21-546 (1967).
,:8 ld.
115 65 CoitI. L. Rtiv. 1062, stpra note 49. at 1072.
Id. at 1073.
hi. It is notable, however, that in certain respects several state statutes go beyond the
quite liberal D.C. Act. As suggested, a valid criticism of the D.C. Act may be the lack of
provision for conditional release. Under the Idaho Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill
Ia. IDA1o Cotm ANN. § 66-301 to 66-359 (1967), the state board of health may release an
improved patient "on the condition that he receive outpatient or non-hospital treatment or
on such other reasonable conditions as may be specified by the board of its designee."
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-338 (1967). A similar provision is available under the Texas
Mental Health Code of 1957, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. arts. 5547-I to 5547-104 (1958),
which permits "'the head of a mental hospital . . . [to] furlough an improved patient," TEx.
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In addition, other rights of the institutionalized person are
specifically recognized by the Act, including the right to
communicate with a limited class of persons outside the hospital,'
a right to care and treatment,139 and the retention of certain civil
rights and liberties during hospitalization.4 0 While in principle such
statutory enumeration of patients' rights may seem objectionable as
impinging upon the executive authority of the hospital, in practice
it probably does not interfere with orderly administration, and
studies have indicated that it "reflect[s] the . . standards of care
in .. .better-run mental hospitals."' 4' Like provisions under the
Draft Act which preceded it, the D.C. Act explicitly provides for
many of the individual rights which would seem to be necessarily
implied from the function of a mental hospital. The creation of a
sympathetic public attitude toward the operation of tjhis Act, and a
more general acceptance of its much needed tenets are,
however, facilitated by the express guarantees.
Right of Communication
For the most part legislative recognition of specific rights of the
mentally ill during hospitalization has been erratic, with some
REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5547-79 (1958); and much like the Idaho statute, provides for
rehospitalization if the patient's mental condition warrants it.
However, it should be noted that the bases for commitment under Idaho and Texas law
are different from that of the District of Columbia. Whereas the District of Columbia
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act requires a finding that "'the person is mentally ill,
and because of the illness is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty"
(D.C. CoDE § 21-541 (1967)), commitment may be achieved under the Idaho and Texas
statutes upon a finding of "need of treatment," IDAHO CODE § 66-317 (1967), or need of
hospitalization for the individual's "own welfare," TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5547-41
(1958). Since only "dangerous" individuals are subject to commitment under the D.C. Act,
the failure to provide for conditional release of patients evidences a congressional reticence to
restore to society those persons previously deemed too harmful to be at large. As long as a
strictly "dangerousness" criterion is adhered to in the District, it may be the case that
conditional release is just not a viable alternative. This would seem especially so since the
term conditional indicates a probability, no matter how slight, that the person is not
completely "'rehabilitated" or "cured"; and thus not eligible for final discharge.
'' D.C. CODE § 21-561 (1967); see note 151 injra and accompanying text.
m D.C. CODE § 21-562 (1967): see notes 212-17 infra and accompanying text.
--A patient hospitalized pursuant to this chapter may not, by reason of the
hospitalization, be denied the right to dispose of property, execute instruments, make
purchases, enter into contractual relationships, vote, and hold a driver's license, unless the
patient has been adjudicated incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction and has not
been restored to legal capacity." D.C. CODE § 21-564(a) (1967); see notes 192-197 iNJra and
accompanying text.
il See Ross, supra note 30, at 979.
Vol. 1969: 677] COMPULSORY COMMITMENT
states displaying an almost schizophrenic quality in their
approach-taking a very progressive and "liberal" course in some
provisions while adhering to seemingly archaic thinking in others."2
The right to communication is anomalous in this respect as it was
"the first right to receive [judicial and legislative] recognition and
is the only right which is guaranteed by the statutes of most
states,' 4't 3 possibly due to the experience derived from the
analogous imprisonment stituation.1'" For years courts have
followed a "hands off" policy with respect to grievances which
prisoners may have against prison administrators."' However, two
competing factors have recently resulted in a new ambiguity which
surrounds this so-called "noninterference doctrine."' t 6 The first
factor is "an understandable reluctance of the courts to interfere
with prison management,"1 ' based on the belief that prison
officials should be given a "wide discretion to cope with the
peculiar disciplinary problems" which the prison presents." 8 The
second is the increasing recognition by the courts that a prisoner is
not completely without rights or remedies, regardless of such
notions as "civil death." It is readily apparent that the same
dilemma, even perhaps in greater magnitude, faces the courts in the
case of the confined mentally ill. Certainly the justifications for
judicial noninterference are even greater, for while the prison is
conducive to abuses by an intolerant administration, the hospital is
by definition a beneficial environment and ideally there should be
no reason to fear the possible denial of patient rights. Practically,
however, abuse in the mental hospital has a long and unfortunate
history, and accordingly, state legislatures have chosen to make
specific provisions of varying degrees of rigor for a right to
communication.'
112 For example, Texas, which has one of the most thoughtful and progressive mental health
statutes in the United States, although making provision for temporary hospitalization and
observation and providing for' specific patient rights, still permits the initiation of
commitment proceedings on the basis of a petition filed by an.r. adult person. TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. art. 5547-41 (1958). The possibility of harassment and the vicious use of such petition
procedure has been discussed previously. See note 67 supra.
" See Ross. supra note 30. at 995.
"' See 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985. supra note 120, at 987.
tI Id. at 989.
Id.
"17 Id. at 986.
1-Id.
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Since denial of a patient's right to communicate may impinge
upon his capacity to petition for release, there is general agreement
that communication with counsel should-be unrestricted.t" ' There is
controversy, however, with respect to other communications, some
statutes providing for the censorship of outgoing mail which
contains threatening or offensive material151J The D.C. Act takes an
approach unlike most jurisdictions and the Draft Act and makes
no provision for the censorship of outgoing communications,
although incoming mail, except from an attorney'or physician, may
be read and withheld by hospital authorities if necessary for the
patient's medical welfare.IaI The degree to which the right to
communication has statutorily evolved is thus evident: The older
statutes authorize the patient to designate a correspondent outside
of the hospital and require that mail be forwarded to the designee
without examination.1 52 However, statutory provisions appearing in
the late 1950's extended the privilege of uncensored mail to and
from a selected class of persons or public officials. The Draft Act
was precursor of this positionY.53 The D.C. Act, by permitting all
outgoing mail to pass uncensored, represents a significant
advancement in the recognition of this variously-interpreted right.
The effectiveness of currently available sanctions to deter or
remedy a denial of the patient's right to communication remains
largely speculative. Early cases demonstrate little more than
occasional verbal reprimands by the judiciary.',' Such castigations,
though severe when administered, were largely ineffective as a
method of control. The Draft Act, in an effort to create an effective
deterrent, provided criminal penalties for the violation of patients'
rights.' 5 Similarly, the D.C.. Act, under its general relief section,
provides for fines of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not
more than three years, or both, for whoever causes the denial of
rights accorded to the patient under the Act."' Yet, despite the
"'See. e.g.. CONNs. GE\. STAT. AN%. § 17-190 (1969); IDAHO CODE A.N. § 66-346(a)(1)
(1967); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5547-86 (1958).
ruSe, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 12-2 (1967). See 65 COLul. L. REV. 1062,
supra note 49, at 1073.
' D.C. CODE § 21-561 (1967).
l Ross. supra note 30, at 996.
" See 1961 Hearings. supra note 2, at 342-43.
zl See. e.g.. Hoffv. State, 279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E.2d 671 (1939); Jacobs v. Worthing. 167
Misc. 702. 4 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1938).
D.C. CODE § 21-591 (1967).
'I Id. § 21-548 (1967).
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apparent feasibility of such remedies under the D.C. Act, a
substantial problem of who is to initiate enforcement remains.
Congress has provided some assistance to the patient's quest for
release by requiring periodic examinations or examination at the
request of certain specified persons,'15 but no provision is made for
the policing of the guaranteed rights. 5 Nor is it indicated how a
violation or denial of rights, penalized under the Code, is to be
detected in the first place. Primary responsibility for regulation
would seem to lie with the mental health commission,"' but this
body can hardly be expected to safeguard effectively the rights of
several thousand patients. Consequently, for the single indigent
patient with no family and without close contact with counsel to
whom he might divulge a violation of his rights, the provisions of
the Act promise to be little more than rights without remedies.
Moreover, this discussion assumes, probably unrealistically, that
the patient is aware of his rights under the Act.6 0
An immediate suggestion for some relief in this area is the
enlargement of the mental health commission from its present
contingent of one permanent attorney and eight rotating physicians,
only two of which staff the commission at any one time. An
alternative solution, which appears quite feasible in a metropolitan
area such as the District of Columbia, is to expand existing,
governmentally-funded legal aid programs. Under such a program,
legal advice concerning denial of rights and petitions for release
coulc be provided patients, especially the indigent, who otherwise
might find it difficult to procure counsel once incarcerated. In
addition, the institutions, due to the regular presence of concerned
outsiders, would be subject to a form of continuous inspection, and
thus, any gross abuses during incarceration would not go
unnoticed.'6 Furthermore, such a "fact-finding force" should
provide a substantial deterrent to aid in the elimination of many
improper practices.6 2
13- Id. § 21-546 (1967). An examination may be requested by the patient, his attorney,
legal guardian, spouse, parent or other nearest relative. Id.
I' Id. §§ 21-561 to 21-565 (1967).
'.' Id. § 21-502 (1967).
2W See notes 120-23 supra and accompanying text.
" As indicated, fairly severe sanctions exist under D.C. CODE § 21-591. The difficulty
lies in discovering violations, the search for such being unusually hampered by problems of
patients' conditions and the great autonomy which the mental institution possesses. See
GOFF\IAN. ASYLUMS: I-SSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION M1 MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER
IN\IATEs (1961).
'. See 1961 Hearings. supra note 2, at 330-45.
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Right to Privacy
As applied to the mentally ill there appear to be two aspects to
the right to privacy or, as it has been phrased, "freedom from
publicity."'11 3 The first of these, the protection of judicial and
hospital records, has been accorded statutory recognition in a few
jurisdictions.' The crux of the argument proffered with respect to
such records is that so long as mental illness carries with it a
stigma which does not attach to other forms of illness patients
should receive legislative protection against the social disgrace
resulting from publicity.', This contention appears equally
applicable to the second aspect of the right to privacy-the privacy
of one's person while institutionalized. As yet, however, legislative
attention has not been directed toward the need for protection in
this latter area.
The necessity for the recognition of a "personal" right to
privacy is dramatically demonstrated by the pending Massachusetts
case of Connonwealth v. Wiseman6" which involves the legality of
a film entitled "Titicut Follies" made at the Bridgewater
Correctional Institute portraying patients in fully nude postures. A
recent case in New York, Cullen v. Grove Press, Inc.17 concerned
the rights of the Bridgewater officials to enjoin the showing of this
same film on grounds of defamation and invasion of privacy. The
court held that in view of the legitimate public interest in state
correctional institutions and the fact that expression by means of
motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press
guarantees of the first and fourteenth amendments, injunctive relief
against the showing of the movie could not be granted unless the
picture falsely portrayed conditions within the institution and was
made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the
truth. The court, however, was careful to note that its holding
"[did] not . constitute an adjudication of rights of non-parties,
such as individual inmates claiming violation of their own personal
rights . ... "8
Patients in mental hospitals would seem to have a right not to
Ross, supra note 30, at 998-1001.
IuSee. e.g.. D.C. CODE § 21-562 (1967).
' Ross, supra note 30, at 998.
- Mass.- 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969).
' 276 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
'Id. at 73 1.
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be so depicted, and in the past, courts have enunciated
constitutional bases sufficient to support such a right. In York v.
Storiy,119 a police officer caused a woman, who had come to the
station to complain of an assault, to be photographed in indecent
positions and then circulated the photographs throughout the police
department. The court held such activities to be a violation of a
fundamental right of privacy guaranteed the plaintiff by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7" Furthermore, the
dissenting opinion in York, attempting to draw a distinction
between the plaintiff and those persons "held" by the government,
conceded that "prisoners have a constitutional right to protection"
from injury while so held,17' an assertion which would appear to be
equally applicable to the committed mental patient, who is also
confined under state power. The privacy interest asserted here is
arguably analogous to the "privacy of the body" or "inviolability
of the person" recognized by the Supreme Court in the nineteenth
century.'- This interest was clearly alluded to in the doctrine of
privacy enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut,17-5 where the Court
invalidated a Conecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives as
a violation of the right to marital privacy.
While there is a tide in constitutional doctrine favoring a broad
scope for first amendment guarantees, 74 cases such as York and
Griswold represent a strong position favoring protection of
individuals against gross intrusions into their privacy7' First of all,
,63 24 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
1,0 Id. at 456. The court further stated: "We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of
privacy than the naked body. . . .A search or one's home has been established to be an
invasion of one's privacy against intrusion by the police, which. if *unreasonable.* is
arbitrary and therefore banned under the Fourth Amendment [Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643
(1961)]. We do not see how it can be argued that the searching o one's home deprives him or
privacy, but the photographing of one's nude body. and the distribution of such photographs
to strangers does not." Id. at 455.
I' Id. at 457 (MacBride. J.. dissenting).
'-See. e.g.. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
1- 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
' See. e.g.. Time. Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan. 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
1 This development on the federal level is a reflection or the "Tortious" right to privacy
which has been enjoying an ever-broadening recognition since 1890 and the publication or an
important work discussing the common law bases of the right. Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privac.r. 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). Prosser notes that -[9or a time authority
was divided, but along in the thirties, with the benediction of the Restatement of Torts. the
tide set in strongly in favor of recognition, and the rejecting decisions began to be
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it has been held that the first dmendment is not absolute and
limits on its exercise do exist. 76 Beyond these as yet ethereal
limitations lies a "protective zone," the intrusion into which will
constitute an abuse of first amendment license, and apparently, the
violation of individual privilege.', The recognition of the protective
zone is a necessary evolvement from the steady realization by the
courts that "freedom of speech" must be tempered by an
observance of rights of others and the reasonable requirements of
society.17 The applicability of such an evolving "right to privacy"
to the mental patient is manifest. The problem remains, however,
of statutorily and judicially defining both the nature and extent of
the right,79 and the development of viable remedies. Criminal
penalties, analogous to those prescribed by statute in the District of
Columbia for violations of the right to communication, '" readily
suggest themselves. However, due to the personal nature of a
transgression of this "right to privacy," provisions for damages
seems justifiable and would supplement the deterrent effect of the
criminal penalties.''
overruled . . . . [Today], it is not one tort, but a complex of four. The law of privacy
comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are
tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except
that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff 'to be let alone.' " W.
PROssER. LAW OF TORTS 831-32 (3d ed. 1964) (citation omitted) [hereinafter cited as
PROssER].
'-' See. e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
t'-See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
"'See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy. 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1890).
"' A recent federal case, Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968),
has indicated that "'the right of privacy might be on more solid ground if it were premised
on privacy as a part of liberty protected by the [dlue [p]rocess [cilause of the [f]ifth and
[flourteenth [a]mendments." Id. at 932. See generaltir Beaney, The Constitutional Right to
Privacy in the Supreme Court. 1962 S. CT. Rav. 212.
80 -Yee note 15o supra and accompanying text. It has been recognized that the fact of illness
itself gives some degree of privilege against unwarranted publicity. Thus, in the case
of Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.V.2d 291 (1942), the Supreme Court of
Missouri stated that "tlhe basis of the right to privacy is the right to be let alone. It has
been suggested that what is actually involved is 'appropriation of an interest in personality.'
The right to privacy (or personality) is a part of the right to liberty and pursuit of happiness.
which recognizes that the individual does not exist solely for the state or society but has
inalienable rights which cannot be lawfully taken from him. so long as he behaves properly."
ld. at 1205, 159 S.W.2d at 294. Certainly if there is any right of privacy at all. it should
include the right to obtain medical treatment at home or in a hospital for an individual
personal condition ...without personal publicity." Id. at 1207, 159 S.W.2d at 295. See
Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
" See the similar remarks of Warren & Brandeis, supra note 176, at 219-220. According
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Retention of Civil Rights During Institutionalization
An important consideration under mental health codes is
whether commitment necessarily requires that the mental patient be
deprived of the power to perform legally effective acts. Most courts
and legislatures have failed to recognize that there are several
aspects to this problem. The first is one of administrative control
over the patient-how far hospital authorities may go in denying
the patient his otherwise normal civil rights.""e In pursuing this
question it has been noted that although there is no abundance of
case law, those courts which have considered the problem tend to
favor the patient.1t Thus, unless restrictions on patients' rights to
communicate,' to seek release by habeas corpus, t' z or to execute
wills,' have received statutory sanction, hospital authorities have
been held unable to invoke institutional regulations to deny patients
their civil rights. For example, in the New York case of Hoff v.
Statet'i a hospital superintendent who surreptitiously attempted to
aid in the suppression of a patient's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was held to have committed a tort, and the state was found
liable for damages in a suit brought by the patient after gaining his
release.188
A second problem is that of evidence, and whether the fact of
hospitalization should be given any evidentiary weight in
to a categorization scheme developed by Prosser, see note 176 supra. the case of the violation
of the mental patient's right of privacy in Commonwealth v. Wiseman, - Mass.
249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), would most likely constitute a "public disclosure of private facts."
PROSSER. supra note 175, at 834. Prosser states: "'The facts disclosed to the public must be
private facts, and not public ones. . . . The ordinary reasonable man does not take offense
at mention in a newspaper of the fact that he has returned home from a visit, or gone
camping. . . . It is quite a different matter when the details of sexual relations are spread
before the public eye, or there is a highly personal portrayal of his intimate private
characteristics or conduct." Id. at 836-37 (citation omitted).
,'e See Ross. supra note 30, at 980-95.
'1 The problem of the relation between hospitalization and incompetency rests to a
considerable degree on judicial construction. Comparatively few statutes or administrative
regulations have been adopted to settle the issue. See Crawfis. Mental (onipeiencr and
Mental Hospitals, 6 CLrV.-MAR. L. REv. 454 (1957).
'p See. e.g., People ex rel. Jacobs v. Worthing, 167 Misc. 702,4 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1938).
' See, e.g.. Hoff v. State, 279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E.2d 671 (1939).
"'See. eg.. In re AlexielT's Will, 94 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1949), aJj'd 277 App. Div. 790, 97
N.Y.S.2d 532, leave to appeal denied. 277 App. Div. 901. 98 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1950) (violation
of hospital regulation did not affect validity of will).
" 279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E.2d 671 (1939).
""'Id.
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determining an individual's capacity to effectuate contracts, wills,
transfers of property, and similar matters. 89 Although it has been
held that in the absence of clear-cut statutory direction
commitment is conclusive proof of incompetency,"" the trend of the
past decade has been toward the inclusion of provisions in mental
health laws which specifically distinguish hospitalization from a
ruling of incompetency and provide for separate proceedings for a
determination of incompetency, regardless of whether the individual
is actually committed. 9' The District of Columbia Act explicitly
separates the determination of incompetency from that of
hospitalization, and provision is made for the retention of certain
legal rights, including the right to dispose of property, the right to
make contracts, and the right to vote.92 In a somewhat less explicit
manner, the Draft Act attempted to give recognition to the
difference between hospitalization and the status of legal
incompetency, a fundamental principle of the Act being that "a
patient who needs hospitalization is not necessarily legally
incompetent, and a person who is legally incompetent does not
necessarily require hospitalization.' 93 Thus, while hospitalization
under the Draft Act did not result in complete loss of legal
capacity, it is clear that the act did not guarantee the patient the
full exercise of his normal legal rights,94 the commentary to the
"' For the effect of hospitalization on the legal capacity of mental patients in 49 states
see Ross. supra note 30, appendix I. Tables 2 and 4, at 1012-14. 1016. See generally Green,
The Operative I.'Ject oj Mental incompetency on Agreements and Wills. 21 Tax. L. REv.
554. at 576-80 (1943).
1-1 'A minority of states hold, even in the absence of clear-cut statutory directions, that
commitment is conclusive evidence of incompetency. These decisions are generally
characterized by rigid and mechanistic application or principles without any real
understanding of the policy problems involved. The courts tend to reason that insanity means
commitment and insanity also means incompetency, so that commitment automatically
results in total legal incompetency. Typical of this inflexible failure to differentiate between
the policy issues bearing on hospitalization and those bearing on competency is the case of
Rohrer v. Darrow. 66 Colo. 463, 182 P. 13 (1919)." Ross, supra note 30, at 985. See also
Turpin's Adm'r v. Stringer, 228 Ky. 32, 14 S.W.2d 189 (1929); Reeves v. Hunter, 185 Iowa
958. 171 N.W. 567 (1919); Walton v. Malcolm. 264 i1. 389, 106 N.E. 211 (1914); Topeka
Water Supply Co. v. Root, 56 Kan. 187, 42 P. 715 (1895).
"' See. c:g.. IDAiIO Com: A-,. §§ 66-355 (Supp. 1967); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5547-
83 (1958).
11 D.C. CODE § 21-564 (1967). See generally Zenoff, Civil Incompetency in the District
oJ Columbia. 32 GEo. \VAsti. L. REV. 243 (1963).
I,- See Ross. supra note 30, at 990.
191 Id. at 99 1.
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act's contrary conclusion notwithstanding. 95 Under the D.C. Act,
however, a patient's rights may be limited only by adherence to a
statutorily prescribed procedure,"' and wrongful denial of such
rights will result in criminal liability.'97
The Doctrine of Consent and the Right to Decline Treatment
It is manifest that modern hospital practice, with its wide range
of available care and treatment, requires some controls and
sanctions to deter intentional interference with the person or
property. Accordingly legal rules have evolved that a physician may
not operate on an individual without his consent, except in cases of
extreme emergency. 98 If the patient is known to be incapable of
giving consent because of infancy, intoxication or mental
incompetence, his failure to object or even his active manifestation
of consent will not protect the physician.' The mere desirability of
treatment does not justify surgery without the consent of the
patient or a near relative. Moreover, the surgeon must not abuse
the consent privilege by committing acts of a substantially different
nature than those agreed upon3' 0
However, the special characteristics of the mental hospital and
its patients present special and serious problems. First of all, most
patients in state institutions are public charges, many of whom do
not have guardians Y" Secondly, it is quite natural for hospital
administrators to proceed on the assumption that the factor of
consent is not relevant in the circumstance since a court would
probably hold that the patient is mentally incapable of giving
consent. Also, under the parens patriae function of the state,
broadly worded statutes which give the hospital authority to care
for the patient could be liberally construed to allow the hospital to
treat without patient consent0 2 Thus, the "ward of the state"
"' Draft Act, supra note 54, § 35. The Act does not guarantee the patient the full
enjoyment or his rights simply because a hospital may ignore them.
"I D.C. CooE § 21-564 (1967).
17 Id. § 21-591.
"1See Mulloy v. Hop Sang [1935] 1 \V.W.R. 714; PROSSER, supra note 175, at 102-04 &
n.47 (3d ed. 1964).
" Pratt v. Davis, 224 Iil. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
PROSSER, supra note 175, at 105-06.
=' See 1961 Hearings. supra note 2, at 340.
= The broad language or many commitment statutes and judicial decisions has
encouraged the view that mental hospitals, which exercise the governmental function of
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status of the mentally ill, if literally adhered to by a court, could be
used to justify nonconsensual, and therefore improper, treatment by
a hospital.
To best alleviate the problems associated with" the consent
doctrine and to provide for restriction on the types of treatment
dispensed in mental hospitals, it would appear that a two-pronged
approach is necessary. Initially, there is a definite need for the
control of potentially dangerous treatment such as electro-shock,
pre-frontal lobotomy and insulin-induced convulsive therapy, all of
which are capable of inflicting severe injuries . 3 Regulation of such
techniques, however, has received little or no attention from the
courts and legislatures, although a few states, in a half-hearted
attempt to exercise some control over such methods, require all
forms of treatment to be recorded in the patient's fileY0' Although
such recordation requirements do have the virtue of imposing some
burden of "justification" upon the hospital dispensing "treatment,"
these after-the-fact attempts at regulation may come toQ late for the
patient if harm already has been .inflicted.
California adopts a different approach by permitting the patient
himself to refuse both shock treatment and lobotomy.2 5 Unfortu-
nately, the effectiveness of this provision in protecting the patient is
almost entirely vitiated by the immediately succeeding section, which
permits the denial of such rights for "good cause" by the person in
charge of the institutional facility or his designee 0 Several other
states provide that except in emergency cases, the hospital may not
perform a major operation until notification is given the guardian or
relative of the patient, if information concerning such persons is in the
patient's recordsY0 7 However, no provision is made for the control of
pare.s patriae, may administer any form of medically justifiable treatment, even in the
absence of c~nsent. A trend accepting this view is discernible, at least in regard to surgery.
See. e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 225.15 (1949); 1961 Hearings, supra note 2. at 340.
'1 The injury most often incurred as a result of electro-convulsive shock therapy 'is
breaking of the narrow stems of the long bones due to the simultaneous constriction of
opposing muscles. If no muscle relaxant is employed, and the patient is not firmly restrained,
such injury may occur. See generally C. STETLER & A. MORiTz, DOCTOR, PATIENT. AND TtIE
LAW 136-37 (4th ed. 1962); Dawidoff, The Malpractice of Psychiatrists, 196.6 DUKE L.J.
696, 698-700.
-" Such an approach has been adopted by the D.C. Act. D.C. CODE § 21-562 (1967).
CAL. WVELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5325(0 & (g) (1968).
=' Id. § 5326 (1968).
See. e.g.. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5123.03 (Supp. 1968).
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such equally dangerous methodologies as electro-shock, lobotomy,
or drug therapy/°s
A rationalization of the consent doctrine and the position of the
state as parens patriae, with respect to potentially dangerous
treatment, can come through the development of a classification
system for types and varieties of treatment. Under such a scheme,
medical attention usually administered as a matter of
routine-periodic examinations, the dispensing of ordinary
medicines for minor illness, and emergency treatment within
specified limits-could be left to the discretion of hospital
physicians. On the other hand, more extensive treatment such as
surgery, and potentially dangerous therapy by insulin, electro-
shock and drugs, should be subject to the consent of either a
guardian, the patient's attorney, or a legal-medical board
established for the specific purpose of reviewing the advisability of
certain forms of treatment.I
Hopefully it would not be necessary to surround the functioning
of such a board with an adversary procedure. Since treatment is
often a matter of urgency, avoiding advocacy would eliminate a
great potential for delay and be in the best interests of the patient.
Thus, the real adversaries under this procedure, if there were any at
all, would be the hospital and the legal-medical board. The hospital
would argue its diagnosis to the board, but that body would make the
final determination upon its own consideration and informed
opinion.210  Theoretically the board would be acting with the
Few, if any, statutory provisions seem to have been enacted with a direct view to
modern shock and drug therapies. However, at least two attorneys general have endorsed the
theory that state hospitals, on the basis of the state's police power and the principle of
parens patriae. are entitled to help the medical welfare of the patient by any type of
recognized treatment, including such therapies as electro-shock or lobotomy, without
the requirement of consent. 1948 PA. Ops. A-r'Y GEN. 120; 1948 Wis. Ops. ATr'y GEN.
502. See 1961 Hearings. supra note 2, at 340-41. It is noteworthy that the D.C. Act,
although providing for a right to treatment, D.C. CODE § 21-562 (1967), does not deal with
the problem of consent to surgery or other dangerous treatment.
!' It is obvious that in many cases it would be of little value to provide for notice to the
patient himself, especially if the individual is severely ill or demonstrates dangerous
tendencies. Furthermore, the capacity of the patient to make a meaningful protest to the
proposed treatment is limited simply because of the fact of his incarceration. Therefore, in
order to challenge more effectively such treatment, provision should be made for notification
of other concerned parties, such as guardians, counsel, or the suggested review board. See
-also Dawidoff, supra note 203, at 699-700.
2111 The board should be permitted to engage upon its own research into the area by
calling upon "outside" experts to supplement the information received from hospital staff
personnel. Such a capacity would add to the objectivity of the board's decision.
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patient's interest in mind and should challenge any treatment
which does not seem proper. Of course, the functions of the board
in reviewing treatment programs after the person is institutionalized
would in no way encroach upon the position of the court in
determining whether the person should be hospitalized in the first
place. Instead such a review process would ensure the proper effec-
tuation of the state's duty to care for its wards, while tempering the
judgments of hospital personnel and subjecting decisions concerning
extensive treatment to a more objective scrutiny.
The various statutes are more definitive with respect to the second
aspect of the control of treatment-regulation of the use of re-
straints-and provisions for such control have appeared in the
majority of statutesY1 The District of Columbia Act specifically
provides that a mechanical restraint212 may not be applied to a mental
patient unless its use is prescribed by a physician, and that the
restraint must be removed when the condition justifying its use no
longer exists 13 Furthermore, the use of the restraint must be made
part of the patient's record, together with reasons for its use. 14
Nevertheless, the statute has at least three deficiencies. First, no
penalties for the wrongful application of mechanical restraints are
clearly provided. The general offense and penalty section of the code
makes reference only to wrongful commitment, false certificates of
physicians or the "denial. . . of a right accorded to [the patient] by
this chapter." 25 Thus, the restraint proscription would have to be con-
sidered to have created a "right to be free from mechanical re-
straints" before that section could fail within the language of the
Act's penalty provision. A second deficiency is less easily remedied;
no provision is made for chemical restraints, a substantial inadequacy
considering that depressant drugs may be more incapacitating than a
straitjacket! 6 Finally, due to the grave psychological effects which
mechanical or chemical restraints would bring to bear on an already
mentally ill patient, a review board similar to that suggested for the
control of potentially dangerous treatment would be an advisable
"'See. e.g.. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-345 (1967); TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. art. 5547-71
(1958).
21Z Mechanical restraints, such as straitjackets, are no longer considered by psychiatric
experts as "ideal" methods of therapy. See 1961 Hearings. supra note 2, at 339.
213 D.C. CODE § 21-563 (1967).
211 Id.
21f Id. § 21-591.
21 See DEIJTSCH, supra note 1, ch. 11.
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addition here. Of course in considering the validity of various forms
of treatment, the standard of tort law that the technique be one
recognized by an established school of medical thought should be
the starting point in determinations undertaken by any legal-medical
review board 17
The Recognition of a Right to Treatment
Perhaps the most controversial issue to arise out of the current
mental health problems of overcrowding and understaffing is that
of the so-called "right to treatment."218 The fact that the average
inmate of a public mental hospital receives inadequate treatment is
becoming ever more apparent to psychiatrists and lawyersYt9 The
situation is such that "in many of our hospitals about the best that
can be done is to give a physical examination and make a mental
note on each patient once a year, and often there is not enough
staff to do this much."20 The effects of such conditions on mental
rehabilitation were vividly presented in a 1957 study, in which it
was noted that understaffing and lack of physical facilities caused a
"social organization" that resulted in custodial rather than
therapeutic care that hindered both the providing of proper
treatment and the planning for improvements, and in the least-
trained member of the staff, the ward attendant, having the greatest
control over the care and treatment of patients. 2 1 The consequences
of such an environment can be extreme, for it is well-estab-
lished that a developing mental disturbance, present at the time-of
commitment and not properly cared for, will become increasingly
'' "Where there are different schools of medical thought, it is held that the dispute
cannot be settled by the law and the doctor is entitled to be judged according to the tenets of
the school he professes to follow.... A 'school' must be a recognized one with definite
principles, and it must be the line of thought of at least a respectable minority of the
profession." PROSSER, supra note 175, at 166.
2" In 1960 an article by Morton Birnbaum introduced a right of an involuntarily
committed mental patient to receive adequate treatment. Birnbaum, supra note 44. See
generally Symposium, The Right to Treatment. 57 GEo. L.J. 673 (1969); Note, The Nascent
Right to Treatment. 53 'VA. L. REV. 1134 (1967).
2" See. e.g., Bassiouni, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Cure and Treatment: Medical Due
Process, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 291 (1966); Szasz, Coninitment of the Mentally Ill.
"Treatment" or Social Restraint, 125 J. OF NERvous AND MENTAL DISORDERs 293 (1957);
Editor's Forum, Commitment Reform. 55 CAL L. REV. 1 (1967); 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 822,
supra note 14; 77 YALE L.J. 87, supra note 27.
L* Solomon, supra note 22, at 7.
211 See Birnbaum, supra note 44.
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serious under inadequate institutional conditionsPI Unfortunately, it
is a simple fact of legislative and medical logistics that these defi-
ciencies cannot be alleviated immediately, since neither the requisite
funds nor personnel are presently available to alter the situation
significantlyY2
With this background, it is not difficult to comprehend the
reasons for the emergence of the "right to treatment." The
constitutional argument most frequently urged to support this right
maintains that to commit someone to a mental institution because
of his need for care and treatment and then to fail to provide such
treatment is a violation of due process.2 m" Indeed, some writers have
gone so far as to state that if medical attention reasonably well-
adapted to the patient's needs is not given, the victim is not a
patient but is virtually a prisonerY5 Additional constitutional bases
for the recognition of the right to treatment have been drawn from
several recent cases. For example, even absent any due process
objections to commitment without treatment, a comparison
between the non-treating hospital and a jail may present such a
similarity as to warrant the conclusion that the commitment is
virtually punishment for an illness, 26 and thus within the "cruel
and unusual" prohibition of the eighth amendment. 27 An arguably
analogous application of the eighth amendment occurred in
Robinson v. California,228 where the Supreme Court indicated that
to punish a person for narcotics addiction was to punish him for an
222 See Note, Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerations in Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 (1947).
2 Birnbaum, supra note 44, at 500-02.
121 See 77 YALE L.J. 87, supra note 27.
2Id. See generally Editorial, A New, Right, 46 A.B.A.J. 516, 517 (1960).
rs 53 "VA. L. REv. 1134, supra note 218, at 1144.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
-n 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Traditionally, the eighth amendment's "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause has been interpreted as relating only to the method and degree of the
punishment inflicted by the state. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910);
Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79
HARV. L. REv. 635, 636-45 (1966). However, this clause received new interpretation by the
Supreme Court in Robidron, where it was determined that the eighth amendment precluded
the punishment of a narcotics addict for his addiction, thus holding for the first time that
there are some situations in which the eighth amendment denies the state power to impose
criminal sanctions of any sort, regardless of the method or degree. 370 U.S. at 662-63; see
Starrs, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism and Traditional Criminal Law Theory, 19 S.C.L.
REv. 349 (1967).
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illness and thus "cruel and unusual." The more recent case of
Powell v. Texas, 29 although apparently restricting the application
of a Robinson-type approach, at least as to chronic alcoholism,20
would not appear to lessen the applicability of the eighth
amendment to mental illness for two reasons. First, the primary
basis of the Court's decision in Powell seemed to be that it is not
evident that chronic alcoholics have such an involuntary, irresistible
compulsion to get drunk that they cannot control their acts and
thus should not be punished under state public drunkenness
statutes. Such a view would be patently inapplicable to mental
illness where the individual, by definition, is unable to "properly"
constrict his behavior in the societal setting. In addition, a probable
secondary reason for the Court's holding in Powell was the apparent
desire to prevent a further extension of the Robinson doctrine into
the area of criminal responsibility. The majority expressed fear that
the minority's approach to Robinson would create a constitutional
doctrine of nzens rea which would force the states to refrain from
punishing anyone whose acts were in any way "involuntary. '231
The difficulties suggested by such considerations of criminal
responsibility do not exist in the question of the constitutional
implications of non-treatment as applied to the mentally ill. Thus,
to incarcerate the mentally ill and withhold the medical attention
which might precipitate their release would seem to be as cruel a
punishment for a person's "status" as jailing him for narcotics
addiction.
- 392 U.S. 514 (1968). The majority in Powell based its decision on the grounds that the
appellant simply had not presented sufficient evidence to show that he and other chronic
alcoholics are unable to control their drinking or refrain from being in public while drunk.
In an opinion in which three of his brothers joined, Justice Marshall reasoned that because
the medical profession is apparently uncertain as to the exact nature and meaning of
"'alcoholism," the Court should hesitate to base constitutional decisions upon medical
findings in this area. Justice Marshall also distinguished Robinson, saying that in that case
the defendant had been convicted for being an addict, while Powell was convicted, not for
being an alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk. Thus, the state had not attempted to
punish a "'status," but rather had imposed penalties for certain proscribed public behavior.
392 U.S. at 521-37.
1 However, the authoritativeness of Powell would seem to be diminished in light of the
fact that the fifth vote of the Court, Mr. Justice White's, was on much narrower grounds
than that of the other four members of the majority. Mr. Justice White, although indicating
his belief that Robinson v. California could not continue to stand if Powell represented an
attempt to distinguish between various forms of addiction, preferred to concur in the
judgment because Powell "did not show that his conviction offended the Constitution." 392
U.S. at 554.
• 392 U.S. at 534-35.
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Furthermore, where commitment originates as a result of a
criminal proceeding, and the civil commitment statute of that
jurisdiction provides for a right to treatment, an equal protection
question .may arise unless the civil standards of commitment are
extended to one committed under criminal process. Presently in
fifteen states, acquittal of a defendant on grounds of insanity
requires that he be committed for an indefinite period.3 2 A series of
recent decisions, however, has indicated that abbreviated procedures
for the commitment of those acquitted by reason of insanity may
be unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clause. In
Baxstrom v. Herold,'3 the Supreme Court unanimously declared
unconstitutional a New York statute under which prisoner- who
had become mentally ill during imprisonment were subject to
summary commitment without jury review. The decision whether to
continue institutional care in a state hospital for the criminally
insane or in a civil hospital had rested with administrators. The
Court held that the fact that petitioner was nearing the end of his
sentence was not relevant to the matter of deterriining either his
sanity or the appropriate institution for confinement. He was
entitled under the equal protection clause to the same procedural
safeguards as persons civilly committed2 3
Two recent cases in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit have further expanded the scope of this equal
protection approach. In Cameron v. Mullen, 2 5 the court reviewed
the D.C. Code provision for mandatory commitment upon
acquittal by reason of insanity and noted that the procedural
inequity between that section and the civil commitment statute was
more severe than the differences attacked by the court in
Baxstrom3 "6 More recently, the court of appeals in Bolton v.
Harris,17 broke with the myopic commitment-centered concern of
previous cases and premised a thorough re-evaluation of the
acquittal-commitment process on the basis of the equal protection
doctrine, holding that in many respects commitment and release
See Goodman, Right to Treatment: The Responsibility of the Courts, 57 GEo. L.. 461
(1968). See. e.g., Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cf. 1968).
= 383 U.S. 107 (1966). See Greenawalt, supra note 125, at 198-200.
211383 U.S. at 115.
387 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
I d. at 200.
395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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standards should be the same for persons acquitted by reason of
insanity as for those civilly committed. In addition, the court
specifically remarked that periodic examination and other rights to
release, expressly provided for under the "civil" Hospitalization of
the Mentally Ill Act, were equally applicable to persons committed
through the criminal route?"
Proper interpretation of the foregoing cases would indicate that
the right to treatment, as statutorily defined under the District of
Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, is capable of
analogous application to the patient committed following acquittal.
Judicial consideration of such an application of the right to
treatment was presented in Rouse v. Caneron,.19 which arose as a
proceeding on petition for habeas corpus. The court, however,
merely suggested the possibility that a failure to supply treatment
may violate the equal protection clause and based its holding on the
grounds that the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act's provision
concerning the right to treatment was intended to cover persons
hospitalized under statutory authorization. 2 l Thus, Rouse, who had
been committed following his acquittal by reason of insanity was
held to have a statutorily provided right to treatment that was
cognizable on habeas corpus, and the constitutional difficulties
engendered by an equal protection approach were thus avoided.
Bolton v. Harris and related cases, however, have taken a more
direct, constitutional orientation. The thrust of the Bolton case
was directed not only at a disparity in commitment procedures, but
attacked release procedures as well.I Furthermore, a denial of the
right to treatment, while not a direct concern of Bolton, would
appear to be intimately involved with a patient's ultimate release
and thus within the ambit of equal protection as applied by the
D.C. Circuit. Certainly in many instances the withholding of
treatment will increase the duration of an individual's
institutionalization and consequently postpone his release. Because
the right to treatment, like periodic examination, is provided for in
2 The court expressly noted that "under civil commitment procedures, a patient is entitled
to periodic examinations by the hospital staff and has the right to be examined by an outside
psychiatrist. . . . Because we ind no rational justification for withholding these safeguards
from a . . . [patient committed after criminal acquittal] we construe . . . [the statute in
question] to require them." Id. at 652.
-9 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
21o Id. at 454-55.
281 395 -.2d at 653.
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the same D.C. statute, the source of that right is no different than
that of periodic examination, and the Bolton rationale would
appear equally applicable.
As the Court noted in Baxstrom, capriciousness of classification
employed by the state is subject to attack as violative of the equal
protection clause. 2 Therefore, if legislation is not "reasonable" in
defining the group to be treated differently, or if it is not
reasonable in the method or extent to which the differentiated
group is deprived of something which others have by right, such
legislation must fall 2 3 To attempt to distinguish the civilly
committed from the "acquitted" patient, promising the former a
right to treatment and the latter only confinement, appears to be the
type of arbitrary classification proscribed by the equal protection
clause. The strongest justification for maintaining disparate commit-
ment and release procedures-the proven dangerousness of the person
acquitted by reason of insanity-does not warrant a different
proceeding for two reasons. First, the determination that a person
was "insane" at the time of the crime does not bear a direct
correlation to his mental state at the time of trial, and thus
acquittal should not result in summary commitment. In addition,
the characterization of the acquitted person as dangerous does not
permit the arbitrary exclusion of the right to treatment since the
criterion for civil commitment under the D.C. Act is one of
"dangerousness" as well. Therefore, any attempted classification
on this basis seems equally improper.
The states, however, have not emulated the right to treatment
approach taken by the District of Columbia. Only eleven states
have adopted or considered the promulgation of such a right.2
However, several state courts have provided guidelines for future
development of the right to treatment in their jurisdictions. New
22 383 U.S. at 115.
21See Matthews v. Hardy, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1969). See generally Tusman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL L. REV. 341, 343-65 (1949).
211 Illinois has adopted such a provision since the decision in Rouse, see ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 91 1/2, § 12-1 (Supp. 1969). New York and Pennsylvania have undertaken legislative
consideration; see SPECIAL STUDY. supra note 36; Reibman, Rights of Mental Patients to
Treatment and Remuneration for Institutional Work: Pending Mental Health Legislation. 39
PA. B.A.Q. 538 (1968). See also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5325 (1968); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 66-344 (Supp. 1967); IOWVA CODE § 225.15 (1949); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.840
(1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-13 (1967); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, §§ 2, 91 (1954); TEX.
Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-70 (1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-46 (1961).
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York, for example, has no statute which expressly grants to a
mental patient a right to treatment, but by drawing upon selected
portions of the Mental Hygiene Law, New York courts have
recognized the right to a substantial extent. Two cases, People ex
rel. Anonymous v. La Burt2 5 and Whitree v. State,48 have utilized
statutory provisions which entrust the state mental health
commissioner with the supervision of a patient's course of
treatment24f 7 to formulate several principles arising under the
traditional notions of police power and parens patriae. First of all,
it is the duty of the State to protect the community and the
mentally ill from their own acts, and secondly, it is a policy of
tht. State to care for and protect mentally ill persons and, if
possible, to cure them of disease. These principles, however, have
not been held to confer on the mentally ill person a right to release
in the event of claimed inadequate treatment, and therefore, if a
patient who claims inadequate treatment is actually mentally ill,
his remedy must lie in the administrative procedures of the New
York Mental Hygiene Law.Y5
Although other jurisdictions have attempted to set outer limits
on what can be done in the name of adequate treatment, the results
of such investigations often have turned on semantic rather than
substantive inquiry. 219 For this reason, the case of Sas v.
Maryland 5 is an important achievement in the evolution of a non-
statutory right to treatment, since it is the first case to suggest that
a court must look beneath labels and examine the substance of the
treatment program in order to determine whether confinement
meets constitutional and statutory requisites'
-5 17 N.Y.2d 738, 217 N.E.2d 31,270 N.Y.S.2d 206, cert. denied. 385 U.S. 936 (1966).
2 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. CI. 1968).
"I See N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 24, 86 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
211 Such procedures involve those set forth in NEw YORK MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 86,
88 (McKinney Supp. 1968). Under § 86 the Commissioner is authorized to conduct
investigations, subpoena witnesses and records and issue reasonable orders based upon his
findings. Under § 88 the Mental Health Information Service is created whereby the state
legislature provides for a further agency to aid in the supervision and protection of the
mentally ill in connection with the retention of involuntary patients. See Letter from Joseph
H. Percoff, Attorney to the State of New York Department of Mental Hygiene, to the Duke
Law Journal, November 21, 1968.
-'See 53 VA. L. REV. 1134, supra note 218.
334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
" Similarly, Director v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966), has been recognized as
the "first judicial inquiry into the treatment program of a state mental hospital." 53
VA. L. REV. 1134,supra note218, at 1151.
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Unfortunately, a case-by-case emergence of a right to treatment
is a costly and time-consuming process, primarily because of the
relatively few actions brought by mental patients-a factor
attributable to patients' general unawareness of their rightsS2 and
to fears that an assertion of the right to treatment will contradict a
later claim of sanity 53 Furthermore, such an "ad hoc" approach
is hampered by an understandable judicial reticence to undertake,
without statutory guidance, the determination and enforcement of
what the court considers to be the "best" treatment. To be sure,
any attempt to delineate a right to treatment would require the
development of a workable definition of responsible treatment
which judges could apply against negligent or palpably
inappropriate treatment without encouraging litigation or
straitjacketing medical procedures.24 The difficulties inherent in an
attempt to enforce such a "right" without standardized nosology
becomes apparent upon considering that one school of psychiatric
thought asserts that simply custody itself, resulting in the removal
of social stresses, constitutes "treatment. '"255 Other psychiatrists,
however, contend that psychotherapy and maximum^ security are to
a great extent incompatible in theory and implementation.
Consequently, some practitioners might recommend hospitalization
in a specific case whereas equally noted colleagues would
vehemently oppose any such confinement. 55
This illustrates that in order to develop and enforce effectively a
right to treatment, the concerted effort of courts and legislatures is
required. Legislatures must statutorily designate and define the
right, thereby arming courts with remedies to correct the effects of
violations and to assure that they do not recur. Those w.ho
advocate judicial recognition and enforcement of the right of the
mentally disabled to medical treatment recognize, however, that
eventually legislatures will be forced to appropriate larger sums for
mental hospitals5 7, Ideally, with greater hospital resources and
231 See notes 125 & f26 supra and accompanying text.
211 See 53 VA. L. REv. 1134, supra note 218, at 1148.
231 The "definitional" problems involved in the "right to treatment" are analogous to
those encountered in defining criteria for original commitment. See notes 33-35 supra
and accompanying text.
2, See 1961 Hearings. supra note 2, at 81 (statement of Jack R. Ewalt, M.D.); 77 YALE
L.J. 87, supra note 27, at 106.
2 See Silverstein, Psychology, Mental Illness. and the Law. 60 W.'VA. L. REV. 55 (1957).
"- See Birnbaum, supra note 44, at 500.
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facilities, all who required mental treatment could be hospitalized
and adequately treated-rendering moot the need for enforcement
of the right to treatment.
The Search for Viable Remedial Alternatives
As a practical matter, however, under the present mental health
system with its limited resources and facilities, treatment for all
who require it is simply impossible. Furthermore, it is doubtful that
the situation will improve greatly in the near future because the
deficiencies of both personnel and physical facilities, the need foi
which will only increase, are not being sufficiently corrected at the
present time?" Consequently, due to the present limitations of the
system, the development of viable remedies to be administered when
a violation of the right to treatment occurs has assumed substantial
importance.
Any investigation of such remedies must look to the specific
statutory criteria under which the individual was originally
committed. To illustrate, where a person has been admitted under
one of the numerous statutes which adopt the "police -power"
criterion of dangerousness, outright release may not always be a
practical remedy " 9 However, as indicated in Rouse v. Cameron.60
alternatives to unconditional release are available, and a form of
conditional release may be in order if continued in-hospital
treatment is inappropriate.261 Thus, if the court should find that a
compulsorily committed patient is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or statutes, it may either allow the hospital a
reasonable opportunity to initiate treatment or make arrangements
for the patient's supervised release 62 In determining whether the
hospital will be given an opportunity to develop an adequate
treatment program, some of the important considerations suggested
in Rouse are the length of time the patient has lacked adequate
treatment, the length of time he has been in custody, the nature of
his mental illness, and the degree of danger resulting from the
mental condition that the patient would present if released.263 It is
2 See 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 822. supra note 14.
"' But see Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
' See id. at 458-59.
See id.
Id. at 458.
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noteworthy that Chief Judge Bazelon, in the Rouse opinion, saw fit
to include conditional release as an alternative to continued
confinement without treatment 6 ' The District of Columbia Act,
unaer which Rouse was decided, makes no provision for
conditional release; Judge Bazelon's suggestibn must rank,
therefore, as a well-considered modification and extension of the
Act.
Several other attempts have been undertaken to fashion more
suitable relief for the patient denied treatment. In Lake v.
Ca,:eroiP-5 the court held that upon reviewing a civilly committed
patient's petition for habeas corpus, a necessary consideration was
whether any less onerous disposition would serve the purpose of
commitment!" Drawing upon the D.C. Act the court fashioned a
principle of the "least restrictive alternative, ' '21 and refused to
accept the proposition that merely showing the senility of the
patient automatically entitled the government to compel her to
accept its "help" at the price of her freedom. 6 In recognizing that
a patient might be entitled to release from a mental hospital if
other facilities were available and appropriate, the court stated:
'[T]he entire spectrum of services should be made available,
including outpatient treatment, foster care, halfway houses, day
hospitals, nursing homes, etc.' The alternative course of treatment
or case should be fashioned as the interests of the person and of the
public require in the particular case. -61
Furthermore, in Covington v. Harris,70 the court indicated that this
principle of least restrictive alternative is "equally applicable to
alternative dispositions within a hospital ' 27' and that the range of
alternatives within a hospital, from maximum security to outpatient
status, is "almost as wide as that of dispositions without. '172
To the extent that lack of treatment is traceable to the. actions
of hospital administrators, criminal sanctions, such as those
available under the D.C. Act,- 3 may act as a deterrent and aid in
2
, See id. at 458-59.
2- 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1966).
26 Id. at 661.
I d. See Covington v. Harris, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1969).
' 364 F.2d at 663.
21 364 F.2d at 659-60.
21 F.2d -(D.C. Cir. 1969).
r, Id. at __.
MId.
-See D.C. CODE § 21-591 (1967).
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correcting the faults. However, to improve directly and immediately
the status of a patient's confinement, judicial review of the
hospital's internal administration seems a necessity.7-1 Suggested
standards for such review were articulated in Tribby v. Cameron-75
where the question was posed as not whether the hospital has made
the best decision, but only whether "it has made a permissible and
reasonable decision in view of the relevant information and within a
broad range of discretion."' 276 Unfortunately, such review of
remedial alternatives, though broadening relief by permitting a
patient to seek transfer to a "better" hospital, assumes a more
suitable and better-equipped institution can be found-an
unwarranted assumption in a number of jurisdictions.277
With respect to non-dangerous persons committed under a
"'need for treatment" statutory criterion, the fact of lack of
treatment would seem sufficient grounds for immediate release. The
only basis for the commitment of those persons is that treatment
can return them to society in a more productive capacity.218 When
this purpose for commitment is not fulfilled, the thread of
justification for confinement snaps. Given such a tenuous basis for
commitment, a violation of the right to treatment should lead to
immediate release unless administrative change or transfer to
another institution will eliminate all violations of the patient's
rights. It should be remembered that unlike commitments based on
dangerousness, where confinement can be justified by the need to
protect society, commitment because of a person's need for
treatment presents no comparable competing state interest to
balance against the right of the patient to release upon failure to
receive treatment 79 The only state function is the restoration of the
committed person to a normal societal role, and if the state does
not conscientiously pursue that goal, or is unable to do so, the
patient should be released.
11 But see 77 YAte L.J. 87, supra note 27, at 107-16.
- 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
d .at 105.
n See 34 U. Ctit. L. REv. 633, supra note 62, at 650.
'See Covington v. Harris. - F.2d -, - (D.C. Cir. 1969).
-' Although it might be argued that the state has an interest in the health of its populace,
this interest is hardly vindicated by failing to provide treatment to the mentally ill and thus
should not be used to counterbalance a person's right to release upon failure to receive
treatment.
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With respect to the untreatable patient, prerequisites for release
have received little attention. Certainly the patient's susceptibility
to treatment should be of prime consideration in determining the
advisability of therapy, and the degree to which a patient is a threat
to society or to himself should be an important factor in any
decision as to his possible release. Thus, dangerous persons, though
untreatable, may be justifiably confined because countervailing
priorities call for the protection of society. However, because
unsusceptibility to treatment, without a change in the state of
psychiatric knowledge, may lead to confinement for the life of the
patient, it should be substantially more difficult to commit and
maintain the commitment of an untreatable, nondangerous person
than an individual subject to release upon improvements 0
The Manner of Challenging Confinement and the Burden of Proof
Equally important as the development of effective remedial
alternatives is the availability of means for patients to challenge
their confinement. The effectiveness of such challenge further rests
on three considerations-what methods are available, how the
burden of proof is to be allocated and what assistance is to be
extended to the patient in the preparation and presentation of his
complaints. The mere fact that a patient seeking release from a
hospital is denied his request should be cQnsidered at least prima
facie evidence of a conflict of interests between himself and hospital
authorities.2 1 Thus, once suit is brought the respective roles of
patient and hospital become that of adversaries, and arguments
marshalled in favor of legal and medical representation during
commitment proceedings are relevant.
Nevertheless, the problem of unequal representation has received
much less attention in the patient-seeking-release situation than in
the case of original commitment. While the majority of states
recognize, by statute, a right to representation by counsel during
hospitalization proceedings,28  virtually no similar provisions are
made for release proceedings. Several courts have attempted to
i"' [TIhe required degree of dangerousness [to justify commitment] should be substantially
higher in the case of a person not amenable to treatment." 34 U. CH. L. REv. 633, supra
note 62. at 649.
2 See Szasz, Hospital Refusal to Release Mental Patient. 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 220
(1960).
28 See Project, supra note 14, at 876.
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delineate such a right to counsel, the most notable example being
the New York Court of Appeals. In People ex rel. Rogers v.
Stanley,2 3 the court held that indigent mental patients have a
constitutional right to assigned counsel in habeas corpus
proceedings invoked to establish their-sanity. Unfortunately, the
cburt's reliance on Gideon v. Wainwrighi28 left it unclear whether
the judges joining in the opinion thought the basic issue was the
right of counsel or equal protection. Since the sixth amendment
relates only to criminal prosecutions, such a constitutional basis
would not seem appropriate to a proceeding brought to test a civil
commitment. And, it has been suggested that "[ilf the decision
is thought to depend primarily on the inequality of one indigent
petitioner when compared with one who can afford counsel, it
represents a significant extension of the principles of [Griffin v.
Illinois]35 to the non-criminal area."' 6
However, regardless of the extent of judicial or statutory
assistance provided, the threshold question remains that of the
methods and procedures available to challenge the fact of
confinement itself. The devices most often suggested in this context
are habeas corpus, mandamus, and injunction-habeas corpus
being the primary vehicle available to those seeking outright
release. The usefulness of habeas corpus has been somewhat in doubt
until quite recently. Courts have traditionally drawn a distinction
between an illegal detention and a deprivation of rights during deten-
tion and have allowed habeas coipus relief only when the detention
itself is illegal.27 Under this rule, persons in custody have obtained
habeas corpus relief when the court that confined them lacked juris-
dictionu or when the confinement proceedings violated due process. 29
Thus, patients committed to mental hospitals have gained release by
demonstrating that they were no longer mentally ill or, if commitment
was supposedly based on a "dangerousness" criterion, by showing
17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"351 U.S. 12 (1956).
- Greenawalt, supra note 1W5, at 200 (1966).
" See generally Note, The Freedom Writ- The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas
Corpus, 61 HARv. L. REv. 657 (1948); Note, Remedies Available to Validly Sentenced
Prisoners Who Are Mistreated by State Penal Authorities, 33 NEB. L. REv. 434 (1954).
-" See, e.g.. Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
-" See. e.g.. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Darnell v. Cameron, 348 F.2d 64
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
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that their illness did not make them dangerous."' However, most
courts have denied habeas corpus relief to patients who have alleged
physical mistreatment or the denial of essential privileges by cus-
todial officials?' Nevertheless, in Rouse v. Cameron,292 the avail-
ability of habeas corpus was assumed to follow from the proposition
that a committed patient who is not given adequate treatment is "in
custody in violation of the . . . laws of the United States. ' ' 2 3 Also,
in Covington v. Harris,29' it was noted that habeas corpus may be
utilized to challenge "the place as well as the fact of confinement,
even if the challenged place is a particular hospital ward . . ..
The availability, therefore, of habeas corpus to the civilly
committed now appears well-established.
Mandamus and injunctive relief, unlike traditional habeas
corpus, are limited to improving the patient's situation while
continuing his confinement, and such devices are appropriate for
the %dangerous" individual whose outright release may not be a
practical alternative?6 A remedy derived from mandamus might be
a judicial decree ordering the hospital administrators to provide
treatment for the patient,.21 but the efficacy of such relief would be
severely limited by the available resources. Therefore, the availabil-
ity of outright release as considered in Rouse, and the treatment
alternatives considered in Lake, should enter into counsel's decision
as whether to pursue relief through mandamus or to utilize some
other device to improve his client's position.
2' See, e.g., Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
"1145 TEx. L. REv. 777, 781 (1967).
S373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
2n Id. at 458.
2- F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1969).
215 Id. at _.
2 Such persons include, primarily, the severely dangerous.
2"See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964). "The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of any action in the nature ofmnandamtns to compel an officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Id. (emphasis added).
See also 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(e) (1964).
Where a patient is in the custody of federal authorities, this provision might be beneficially
employed, since it has been construed as contemplating -action affirmative in nature, rather
than injunctive relief to prohibit improper action or conduct." Harms v. Fed. Housing
Administration, 256 F. Supp. 757, 760 (D. Md. 1966). One obvious limitation, however, on
the successful employment of mandamus, in either state or federal court, is that it has
traditionally been limited to ministerial, nondiscretionary acts. See. e.g.. Wilbur v. United
States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930); Prairie Band of the Pottawatomie Tribe of
Indians v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir.), ceri. denied. 385 U.S. 831 (1966); Kurio v.
United States, 281 F. Supp. 252, 263 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
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An additional device for remedying the violations of rights of
mental patients is afforded by federal civil rights legislation,298
which provides that any person who under color of law or custom,
deprives any person under the jurisdiction of the United States of
his constitutional or legal rights "shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. ' ' 299 Already held applicable to prisoners,30
section 1983 would seem equally available for courts to redress
mistreatment of the hospitalized mentally ill. It should not be
difficult to demonstrate that hospital authorities acted under color
of state authority since the commitment of the mentally ill is based
on the traditional notion of the state's police power, or its power to
care for its wards. Still, problems may arise because relief under
section 1983-much like habeas corpus-requires a determination
by the court of the rights which the plaintiff possesses.0 0 However,
Rouse v. Cameron, by holding the right to treatment recognizable
in a habeas corpus proceeding, should establish sufficient precedent
as to the existence of that right. Statutory provision for other rights
of the mentally ill should likewise meet this prerequisite.
The final hurdle facing the mentally ill is that of the burden of
proof to be borne. To originate confinement, the state must
demonstrate that the patient qualifies for commitment pursuant to
the terms of the relevant statute.30 2 At habeas corpus or
recommitment proceedings, it is presumed that the condition of
insanity continues and, therefore, the burden of proving sanity rests
upon the person seeking release 33 In Overholser v. O'Beirne,311 the
court held that the patient must demonstrate that he has so
recovered that there no longer exists an abnormal mental condition
which in the reasonably foreseeable future would endanger the
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-95 (1964);see 2 J. PuB. L. 181, 185 (1953).
' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). See generally Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the
Wake oJ Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486 (1969).
"See. e.g.. Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961); Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp.
996 (N.D. II1. 1949). affd, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950);
Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
: See 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985, supra note 120, at 1008 (1962).
:' See notes 27-49 supra and accompanying text.
See. e.g., Rosario v. State, 42 Misc. 699, 705, 248 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737-38 (1964).
= 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (O'Beirne had instituted a habeas corpus proceeding for
release from confinement in mental institution to which he had been committed following
acquittal from criminal charges by reason of insanity).
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patient or the public in the event of his releasels The reasons for
this high threshold for obtaining release results from both the fear
of unfortunate incidents after premature release05 and the beneficial
role which the hospital is thought to occupy. But since the state
usually possesses all of the crucial evidence, legal and medical
representation must be provided the patient or his opportunity to
present a successful case will be virtually nonexistent.
Consequently, whether the patient seeks outright release as in
O'Beirne,17 or merely alternative treatment as in Covington, °s it
appears inequitable to force him to carry such a high burden of
proof. Such was the opinion in Lake 9 in which the court indicated
that since proceedings involving the care and treatment of the
mentally ill are not strictly adversary, the patient should not be
required to carry the burden of showing the availability of
alternatives. Since the hospital administration should, be aware of
the full range of available therapy, placing the duty to investigate
alternatives here "can hardly be assailed as an .intolerable
burden . . . ."Il Thus, when the appropriateness of confinement
has been called into question by a patient's petition or complaint,
its continued validity must depend upon a showing of a mental
condition that precludes release, and a demonstration that hospital
authorities are pursuing a proper treatment programP'
SId. at 856.
"
6 See 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 633, supra note 62, at 655.
See note 304 supra.
" See note 294 supra and accompanying text.
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
t Covington v. Harris, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1969).
"' See id. The question of what standard should be required for the maintenance of a
commitment has been considered by one author, who suggests that "[t]he threshold at which
the state may take action should also be the threshold at which the state ceases its activity.
The result would be a general rule that the state cannot maintain a confinement unless the
patient is susceptible to original commitment." 34 U. CHm. L. REv. 633, supra note 62, at 658.
Such a suggestion, however, fails to take into consideration several fact ors. First, those cases
in which the person may not be so ill as to enable the court to originally commit are
precisely the same cases in which the inexactness of psychiatry is best demonstrated. Thus, in
effect, the institutions would be able to treat patients until this point, and no further.
Secondly, too early a return to society and its rigors may cause a relapse in the "unsteady"
patient which might have been prevented if slightly longer hospitalization had been possible.
Finally, it is a mistake to establish general rules for a situation so individual and person-
specific as that of mental illness.
However, the State should be obliged to assist the patient in his quest to prove his sanity,
for his release would seem to be in the best interests of the person and the public.
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CONCLUSION
Judicially and legislatively, the four years since the enactment of
the District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act
have manifested a renewed and vigorous national concern with the
plight of America's mentally ill. After two hundred years of
short-sightedness, mental illness finally has come to be recognized
as a delicate medical, social and legal problem not capable of easy
or swift conclusion. However, to remedy fully the deficiencies which
still exist and to eradicate the view of mental health treatment as a
well-intentioned failure, several revisions and much continued effort
is necessary.
The problem as it now exists has several aspects, which
primarily include the necessity for increasing governmental
expenditures and attracting competent personnel into the mental
health field. The result of increased financial support should be
immediate and twofold. First, the expansion of facilities, raising
the quality and variety of care and therapy, together with a
concomitant liberalization of admission and discharge policies, will
increase the incidence of those seeking voluntary aid. A secondary
product of expansion will be the elimination of much of the
necessity for the "right to treatment."
Nevertheless, assuming that such needed expenditures are not
immediately forthcoming, much can be done in the interim to
further mental health. Initially, a sound statutory and legal basis
for the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness at all stages of
severity must be developed according to the most modern
psychiatric and medical knowledge. To attain such a system, a
mere rapprochement between the professions can no longer be the
goal. Instead, commitment and treatment schemes must be the
result of a total synthesis of legal and medical considerations, and a
productive, positive approach must replace the appeasement and
concessions made in the past to the detriment of the mental patient.
Psychiatry must further remove itself from an artificial semantic
approach to mental illness and seek to isolate causative factors
which can aid an informed judiciary, trained in basic psychiatric
and sociological principles.
In addition, judicial and legislative concern must continue
beyond the act of commitment, penetrate the asylum's walls, and
assure proper treatment and speedy discharge. Mental health
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administrations must be made aware that the judiciary is
concerning itself with those persons who are hospitalized against
their will. Surely, the work of both the courts and the psychiatric
profession must be to respect and protect the rights of a mentally
ill person and to provide for his treatment. Although recent court
decisions have evidenced such an approach, at the same time they
have manifested professional distrust-a situation which detracts
from both professions and injures most the patient.
Finally, although this comment has accepted as a basic premise
the present judicially-oriented involuntary commitment procedures
and has attempted to suggest positive variations on this basic
theme, this country's approach toward the improvement of mental
health programs must always remain amenable to constructive
criticism. The most important step, the acceptance of responsibility,
has been taken. Education, publicity, and the general attitudes of
an enlightened public must continue to bring new concepts to the
legislatures and minds of the people and shatter the tenacious legal
and medical anachronisms which so long have shrouded mental
health.
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